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Summary findings
Despite  tremendous  macroeconomic  instability  in Brazil,  negative  "growth"  effect,  and  unfortunate  changes  in the
the country's distributions of urban income in 1976 and  structure of occupations and participation in the labor
1996 appear, at first glance, deceptively similar. Mean  force.
household income per capita was stagnant, with rninute  * Two factors that tended to reduce poverty -
accumulated growth  (4.3 percent) over the tvo  decades.  improved educational endowments across the board, and
The Gini coefficient hovered just above 0.59 in both  a progressive reduction in dependency ratios.
years, and the incidence of poverty (relative to a poverty  The net effect was small and negative for measured
line of RS60 a month in 1996 prices) remained  inequality overall, and negligible for the incidence of
effectively  unclhanged  over the  period,  at 22  percent.  poverty  (relative  to "high"  poverty  lines).
Behind this apparent  stability, however, a powerful  But the net effect was to substantially increase extreme
combination of labor market, demographic, and  poverty - suggesting the creation of a group of urban
edticational dynamics was at work, one effect of which  households excluded from any labor market and trapped
was to generate a substantial increase in extreme urban  in indigence.
poverty.  Above the 15th percentile, urban Brazilians  have
Using a decomposition methodology based on  "stayed put" only by climbing hard up a slippery slope.
microsimulation, which endogenizes labor incomes,  Counteracting falling returns in both self-employment
individual occupational choices, and decisions about  and the labor market required substantially reduced
education, Ferreira and de Barros show that the  fertility rates and an average of two extra years of
distribution of income was being affected by:  schooling (which still left them undereducated  for that
- Three factors that tended to increase poverty - a  income level).
decline in average returns to education and experience, a
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1.  Introduction.
Both by the standards of its own previous growth record, during the 'Brazilian miracle' years of
1968-1973, and by those of other leading developing countries thereafter, notably in Asia, the
two decades between 1974 and 1994 - between the first oil shock and the return of stability with
the Real plan - were dismal for Brazil. First and foremost, they were characterized by persistent
macroeconomic disequilibrium, the  main  symptoms  of  which  were  stubbornly  high  and
accelerating inflation and a GDP time-series marked by unusual volatility and a very low positive
trend. Figure 1 below plots annual inflation and GDP per capita growth rates for the 1976-1996
period.
[See Figures la  and lb in Appendix 4]
The macroeconomic  upheaval involved three price and wage freezes (parts of the Cruzado Plan
of 1986, the Bresser Plan of 1987 and the Verao Plan of 1989) - all of which were followed by
higher inflation rates; one temporary financial asset freeze (with the Collor Plan of 1990); and
finally a successful currency reform followed by the adoption of a nominal anchor in 1994 (the
Real  Plan).  The  national  currency  changed  name  four  times. 2 Throughout  the  period,
macroeconomic policy was almost without exception characterized by relative fiscal laxity and
growing monetary stringency.
In addition, substantial structural changes were taking place. Brazil's population grew by 46.6%
between 1976 and 19963,  and became more urban (the urbanization rate rose from 68% to 77%).
Average education of the over-ten population rose from 3.2 to 5.3 effective years of schooling. 4
Open unemployment grew steadily more prevalent. The sectoral composition of the labour force
changed  away  from  agriculture and  manufacturing, and  towards  services. The  degree  of
formalization of the labour force declined substantially: the proportion of formal workers (wage
2 The changes were from Cruzeiro to Cruzado in 1986; from Cruzado to Novo Cruzado in 1989; from Novo
Cruzado back to Cruzeiro in 1990,  and from Cruzeiro to Real in 1994.
3 See Table Al, Appendix 1, for a complete population series.
4 'Effective' years of schooling are based on the last grade completed, and are thus net of repetition.3
workers with formal documentation) was almost halved, from just under 60% to just over 30% of
all workers. And not least, despite the morass, real GDP per capita and mean household per
capita income (for the spatially undeflated national distribution) were both some 22.5% higher in
1996 than 1976.5 Importantly, however, this increase was closely associated with rural-urban
migration; accumulated growth in mean urban household per capita incomes was a mere 4.3%
(spatially deflated). See Table  1 below.  And yet,  despite the macroeconomic turmoil  and
continuing structural changes, however, a casual glance at the headline inequality indicators and
poverty incidence measures reported at the bottom of Table  1 might suggest that little had
changed in the Brazilian income distribution between 1976 and 1996.
__________________________________  l1976  1981  1985  1996
GNP (in constant  1996  Reais - thousands)*  434,059  538,475  599,130  778,820
GNP  per capita  (in constant  1996  Reais)*  4,040  4,442  4,540  4,945
Annual  Inflation  Rate 1 42%  84%  190%  9%
Open Unemployment 2 1.82%  4.26%  3.38%  6.95%
Average Years of Schooling 3, 4  3.23  4.01  4.36  5.32
Rate  of Urbanization  4  67.8%  77.3%  77.3%  77.0%
Self-employed  as share of Labor  Force4 27.03%  26.20%  26.19%  27.21%
Share of Formal  Employment 4 *  6  57.76%  37.97%  36.41%  31.51%
Mean Household  Per Capita Income  4, 5  265.10  239.08  243.15  276.46
Inequality  (Gini) 4  0.595  0.561  0.576  0.591
Inequality  (Theil  - T) 4  0.760  0.610  0.657  0.694
Poverty  Incidence  (R$ 30/month)  4  0.0681  0.0727  0.0758  0.0922
Poverty Incidence (R$ 60/month) 4  0.2209  0.2149  0.2274  0.2176
Notes: *) Annual figures.
1) Percent, from January to December. Based on the IGP-DI for 1976, and on the INPC-R for all other years.
2) Based on the IBGE Metropolitan Unemployment Index.
3) For all individuals 10 years of age or older, in urban areas.
4) Calculated from the PNAD samples by the authors. See Appendix 1.
5) Urban only, monthly and spatially deflated. Expressed in constant 1996 Reais.
6) Defined as the number of employees 'com carteira' as a fraction of the sum of all wage employees and self-
employment workers.
5  See Table 1, and Appendix I for details.4
But,  as  is  often  the  case,  casual  glances may turn  out  to  be  misleading. This  apparent
distributional stability belies a number of powerful, and often countervailing, changes in four
realms:  the  returns  to  education  in  the  labour  markets;  the  distribution  of  educational
endowments over the population; the pattern of occupational choices; and  the demographic
structure resulting from household fertility choices. In this paper, we note two puzzles about the
evolution  of  Brazil's  urban  income  distribution  in  the  1976-1996 period,  and  suggest
explanations for them.
The first puzzle is posed by the combination of growth in mean incomes and stable or slightly
declining inequality, on the one hand, and rising extreme poverty on the other. We argue that this
can only be explained by the growth in the size of a group of very poor households, who appear
to be effectively excluded both from the labour markets and from the system of formal safety
nets. This group is trapped in indigence at the  very bottom of the urban Brazilian income
distribution, and contributes to rises in poverty measures particularly sensitive to  the depth
(FGT(l)) and severity (FGT(2))  of poverty, particularly when poverty is defined with respect to a
low poverty line. E(O) fails to respond to this group because of a rise in the share of families
reporting (valid) zero incomes. 6 Other inequality measures, which also fall slightly between 1976
and 1996, compensate for these increases in poverty by declining dispersion further up along the
distribution. But the reality of the loss in income to the poorest group of urban households is
starkly captured by Figure 3 (in Section 2), which plots the observed (truncated) Pen parades for
the four years being studied. The main endogenous channel through which the marginalization of
this group is captured in our model is a shift in their occupational 'decisions' away from either
wage  or  self-employment, towards unemployment or  out  of the  labour force. 7 As  Table  1
indicates, there was certainly a decline in fornal employment as a share of the labour force.
Second, the evidence which we will examine in Section 3 below reveals downward shifts in the
earnings-education  profile, controlling for age and gender, in both the wage and self-employment
6 See  Appendix  1,  Table  A2.
7 The use of terns  such as 'occupational choice' or 'decision' should not be taken to imply an allocation of
responsibility. It will become clear, when the model is presented that, as usual, these are choices under constraints.5
sectors. 8 Despite a  slight convexification of the profile, the magnitude of the shift implies a
decline in the (average) rate of return to education for all relevant education levels. Similarly,
average returns to experience also fell unambiguously for 0-50 years of experience (see figure 5).
The combined effect of changes in  these returns - the  'price effects'  - was an increase in
simulated poverty, for all measures, and for both lines. Simulated inequality also rose, albeit
much more mildly. Both effects were exacerbated by simulating the changes (to 1996) of the
determinants of labor force participation decisions were also taken into account. The second
puzzle, then, is what forces counterbalance  these price and occupational choice effects, so as to
explain the observed stability in  inequality and  'headline'  poverty. 9 We find that they were
fundamentally the combination of increased education endowments, moving workers up along
the flattening earnings-education slopes, with  an increase in  the correlation between family
income and family size, caused by a more than proportional reduction in dependency ratios and
family sizes for the poor. This demographic factor had direct effects on per capita income -
through a reduction in the denominator - and indirect effects - through participation decisions
and higher incomes.
Naturally, the co-existence of  these two  phenomena - or  'puzzles'  - implies  that this  last
demographic effect did not extend to all of Brazil's poor. At the very bottom, some are being cut
off from the benefits of greater education and economic growth (such as these were), and remain
trapped in the sinking valley.
We address these issues by means of a micro-simulation-based decomposition of distributional
changes, developed by Bourguignon et. al. (1998), which itself builds upon the work of Almeida
dos Reis and Paes de Barros (1991), and  Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993). The approach is
described in Section 3 below, and has two distinguishing features. First, unlike other dynamic
inequality decompositions such  as that  proposed by  Mookherjee and  Shorrocks (1982), it
decomposes the effects of changes on an entire distribution, rather than on a scalar sumnmary
statistic (such as the mean log deviation). This allows for much greater versatility: within the
B This  shift  is from 1976  to 1996,  and  takes  place  after  upward  shifts  in the 1980s.  See Figure  4.
9 By 'headline'  poverty,  we mean  poverty  incidence  computed  with  respect  to the R$60/month  poverty  line.6
same framework, a wide range of simulations can be performed to  investigate the effects of
changes in specific parameters on any number of inequality or poverty measures (and then for
any number of poverty lines or assumptions about equivalence scales). More fundamentally, it
allows us to observe the effects of particular simulations on the entire distribution, as we do in
Figures 6 - 15, rather than merely on a couple of scalar indices. Second, the evolving distribution
which it decomposes is a distribution of household incomes per capita (with the recipient unit
generally being the individual). Therefore, moving beyond pure labor market studies, the effect
of household composition on living standards and participation decisions is explicitly taken into
account. As it turns out, these are of great importance for a fuller understanding of the dynamics
at hand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the main findings
of the literature on income distribution in Brazil over the period of study, and presents summary
statistics and dominance comparisons for the four observed distributions we analyze: 1976, 1981,
1985 and 1996. Section 3 outlines the basic model and describes the empirical methodology.
Section 4 presents the results of the estimation stage and discusses some of its implications.
Section 5  presents the  main results of  the simulation stage, and  decomposes the  observed
changes in poverty and inequality. Section 6 concludes and draws some policy implications.
2.  Income Distribution in Brazil from 1976 to 1996: a brief review of the literature and
of our data set.
There  is  little  disagreement in  the  existing  literature  about the  broad  trends  in  Brazilian
inequality since reasonable data first became available in the 1960s. The Gini coefficient rose
substantially during the 1960s, from around 0.500 in  1960 to 0.565 in  1970 (see Bonelli and
Sedlacek, 1989). There was a debate over the causes of this increase, spearheaded by Albert
Fishlow on the one hand, and Carlos Langoni on the other, but there was general agreement that
the sixties had seen substantially increased dispersion in the Brazilian income distribution.7
The 1970s displayed a more complex evolution. Income inequality rose between 1970 ad 1976,
reached a peak on that year, and then fell - both for the distribution of total individual incomes in
the economically active population (PEA) and for the complete distribution of household per
capita incomes - from 1977 to 1981. This decline was almost monotonic, except for an upward
blip  in  1980. See  Bonelli  and  Sedlacek (1989), Hoffrnan (1989)  and  Ramos (1993).  The
recession year of 1981 was a local minimum in the inequality series, whether measured by the
Gini or the Theil-T index. From 1981, it rose during the recession years of 1982 and 1983. Some
authors report small declines in some indices in 1984, but the increase was resumed in 1985. By
that year, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of household incomes per capita had risen from
0.574 in  1981 to 0.589 (see Ferreira and Litchfield, 1996). Hoffman (1989) and Bonelli and
Sedlacek (1989) report similar increases.
1986, the year of the Cruzado Plan, saw a break in the series, caused both by a sudden (if short-
lived) decline in inflation, and a  large increase in reported household incomes. Stability and
economic growth led to a decline in measured inequality, according to all authors. Thereafter,
with the failure of the Cruzado stabilization attempt and the return to  stagflation, inequality
resumed its upward trend, with the Gini finishing the decade at 0.606. Table A2.1 in Appendix 2
summarizes the findings of this literature, both for per capita household incomes and for the
distribution of total individual incomes in the economically  active population.
The general trends identified in the existing literature are mirrored in the statistics for the years
with  which we  concern ourselves  in this  paper, namely  1976, 1981, 1985 and  1996. The
distributions for  each  of  these  years  come  from  the  Pesquisa  Nacional  por  Amostra  de
Domicilios (PNAD), run by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE). Except
where otherwise explicitly specified, we deal with distributions where the welfare concept is total
household income per capita (in constant 1996 Reais, spatially deflated to adjust for regional
differences in average cost-of-living), and the unit of analysis is the individual. Details of the
PNAD  sampling coverage  and  methodology, sample  sizes,  the  definition of  key  income
variables, spatial and temporal deflation issues, and adjustments with respect to the National
Accounts baseline are discussed in Appendix 1.8
Table 2 below presents a number of summary statistics for these distributions - in addition to the
mean, which was provided in Table 1 above. The four inequality indices, which will be used
throughout this paper, are the Gini coefficient and three members of the Generalized Entropy
Class  of  inequality indices, E(e).  This  class  of  measures satisfies a  number of  desirable
properties, such as  the  strong Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, scale invariance, population
replication invariance and decomposability. See Cowell (1995) for a discussion. Specifically, we
have chosen E(O), also known as the mean log deviation or the Theil - L index; E(l),  more
famously known as the Theil - T index, and E(2), which is half of the square of the coefficient of
variation. These provide a useful range of sensitivities to different parts of the distribution. E(O)
is more sensitive to  the bottom of the distribution, while E(2)  is more sensitive to higher
incomes. E(1) is roughly neutral, whereas the Gini places greater weight around the mean.
We  also  present three  poverty  indices from  the  Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT)  additively
decomposable class P(a). P(O), also known as the headcount index, measures poverty incidence.
P(l) is the normalized poverty deficit; and P(2) is an average of squared normalized deficits, thus
placing greater weight on incomes furthest from the poverty line. We calculate each of these with
respect to two poverty lines, representing R$1 and R$2 per day, at 1996 prices.
Each of these poverty and inequality indices is presented both for the (individual) distribution of
total household incomes per capita, and for an equivalized distribution using the Buhmann et. al.
(1988) parametric class of equivalence scales, (with 0 = 0.5). This provides a rough test that the
trends we describe are robust to different assumptions about the degree of economies of scale in
consumption within households. Whereas a per capita distribution does not allow for any such
economies of scale, taking the square root of family size allows for them to a rather generous
degree. As usual, per capita incomes generate an upper bound for inequality measures, whereas
allowing  for  some  extent  of  local  public  goods within  households  raises  the  income  of
(predominantly poor) very large households, and lowers inequality.  In the case of the poverty
measures, in order to  concentrate on the household re-ranking effect, and to abstract from the9
pure mean scaling effect, the poverty lines were adjusted as follows: z* = z[,u(n)]3-,  where ,u(n)
is the mean household size in the distribution.
1976  1981  1985  1996
Median (1996 R$)*  127.98  124.04  120.83  132.94
Inequality
Gini - 0 = 1.0  0.595  0.561  0.576  0.591
Gini - 0 = 0.5  0.566  0.529  0.548  0.567
E(0) - 0 = 1.0  0.648  0.542  0.588  0.586
E(0) - 0 =0.5  0.569  0.472  0.524  0.534
E(1) - 0 = 1.0  0.760  0.610  0.657  0.694
E(1)  - 0 =0.5  0.687  0.527  0.580  0.622
E(2)-  0  1.0  2.657  1.191  1.435  1.523
E(2)-  0=0.5  2.254  0.918  1.134  1.242
Poverty  - R$30/ month  ___
P(0) - 0  1.0  0.0681  0.0727  0.0758  0.0922
P(0) - 0 =0.5  0.0713  0.0707  0.0721  0.0847
P(1) - 0 =  1.0  0.0211  0.0337  0.0326  0.0520
P(1) - 0  0.5  0.0235  0.0315  0.0303  0.0442
P(2) - 0 =1.0  0.0105  0.0246  0.0224  0.0434
P(2)-  0=0.5  0.0132  0.0226  0.0204  0.0357
Poverty  - R$601  month
P(0) - 0 =  1.0  0.2209  0.2149  0.2274  0.2176
P()_-  fl=0.5  0.2407  0.2229  0.2382  0.2179
P(1) - 0 =_1.0  0.0830  0.0879  0.0920  0.1029
P(l) - 0  0.5  0.0901  0.0875  0.0927  0.0960
P(2)_  - 0  1.0  0.0428  0.0525  0.0534  0.0703
P(2)_  - 0_ 0.5  0.0471  0.0508  0.0521  0.0625
Note: *: For urban areas only, and spatially deflated. See Appendix 1.
The median incomes in Table 2 behave roughly in tandem with the means reported in Table 1,
and  in accordance with the macroeconomic cycle:  1981 was a  recession year, followed by
stagnation in 1982 and a severe recession in 1983, from which the median - unlike the mean -
had not yet recovered by 1985. Both subsequently rose to 1996. The table also confirms that the
evolution of  inequality over the period is marked by  a decline from  1976 to  1981, and a
subsequent deterioration over the remaining two sub-periods. Furthermore, this trend is robust to10
the  choice of  equivalence scale, proxied here by  two  different values  for  0,  although the
inequality levels are always lower when we allow for economies of scale within households. It is
also robust to the choice of inequality measure, at least as regards the inequality increases from
1981 to  1996 and from  1985 to  1996, as the Lorenz dominance results identified in Table 3
indicate.
Figure 2a plots the four Lorenz curves. Their proximity suggests, as we have stated, that even
where  Lorenz dominance is  detected, the  changes in  inequality  over  this  period are  not
quantitatively very  large. Figure  2b  truncates the  Lorenz  curves for  the  first  40%  of  the
distribution, so as to show the separation between the curves more clearly. The dominance of
1981 and 1985 over 1996 shows clearly. 1976 also lies everywhere above 1996 for this range,
but the lines cross at a higher percentile. Be that as it may, the cumulative income share for the
poorest four deciles was certainly lower in 1996 than in 1976.
[See Figures 2a and 2b in Appendix 41
The results for poverty are more ambiguous. With respect to the higher poverty line, incidence is
effectively  unchanged throughout the  period  (and  even  displays  a  slight  decline  for  the
equivalized distribution). FGT(1 and 2), however, show increases over the period, and these
become both more pronounced and more robust with respect to 0, as the concavity of the poverty
measure increases. This suggests that depth and severity of poverty, affected mostly by falling
incomes at the very bottom of the distribution, were on the rise. This is confirmed by the trend of
all three P(a)  indicators, with respect to  the indigence line. Once again, the trend is  more
pronounced the higher cc.  For P(1) and P(2), the monotonicity of the increase is independent of 0.
As a result there is only one welfare dominance result among the years studied.
These results are reflected in Table 3 below, where a letter L (F) in cell (i, j)  indicates that the
distribution for year i Lorenz dominates (first order stochastically dominates) that for year j.
1981 and 1985 both display Lorenz dominance over 1996, as suggested above. There is only one
case of first-order welfare dominance throughout the period and, symptomatically, it is not of a11
later year over an earlier one. Instead, money-metric social welfare was unambiguously higher in
1976  than in 1985, as indicated above. Indeed, all poverty measures reported for both of our lines
(and for 0 = 1.0) are higher in 1985 than in 1976.10  This is conspicuously not the case for a
comparison between 1976 and 1996. Whereas poverty measures very sensitive to the poorest are
higher for  1996, poverty incidence for  'higher'  lines fall from  1976 to  1996, suggesting a
crossing of the distribution functions. Figure 3 shows this crossing, by plotting the Pen parades
(F-'(y)) - truncated at the 60' percentile - for all four years analyzed. Note that whereas 1976 lies
everywhere above 1985, all other pairs cross. In particular, 1976 and 1996 cross somewhere near
the 17t  percentile.





[See Figure 3 in Appendix 4]
Before we  turn  to the  model used to  decompose changes in the  distribution of household
incomes, which will shed some light on all of these changes, it will prove helpful to gather some
evidence of the evolution of educational attainment, as measured by average effective years of
schooling, and for labour force participation, for different groups in the Brazilian population,
partitioned by gender and ethnicity. Table 4 presents these statistics.
As can be seen, there was some progress in average educational attainment in urban Brazil over
this period. Average effective years of schooling, as reported in Table 1, rose from 4.2 to 5.3. In
fact, this  piece  of  good news will prove  of  vital  importance in  having prevented a  more
'  Note that this first-order welfare dominance is not robust to a change in 0 to 0.5.12
pronounced increase in poverty. Table 4 now reveals that the male-female educational gap has
been eliminated, with females older than ten being on average slightly more educated than males.
Clearly, this must imply a large disparity in favour of girls in recent cohorts. While a cohort
analysis of educational trends is beyond the scope of this paper",  such a rapid reversal may in
fact warrant a shift in  public policy towards programmes aimed at keeping boys in school,
without in any way discouraging the growth in female schooling. Finally, note the remarkable
disparity  in  educational attainment across  ethnic  groups, with  Asians  substantially above
average, and blacks and those of mixed race below it.
Tabe 4  Fuc~tina1a~  LaorFore  artciatin1tat#i,b  gedr  and race~
1976  1981  1985  1996
Average  Years of Schooling  (Males)  4.04  4.36  5.20
Average Years of Schooling (Females)  3.14  3.99  4.37  5.43
Average Years of Schooling  (Blacks and MR)  - - - 4.20
Average  Years of Schooling  (Whites)  6.16
Average Years of Schooling  (Asians)  - - 8.13
Labor Force Participation (Males)  73.36%  74.63%  76.04%  71.31%
Labor Force Participation (Females)  28.62%  32.87%  36.87%  42.00%
Labor Force Participation  (Blacks and MR)  - - 55.92%
Labor Force Participation  (Whites)  56.41%
Labor Force Participation  (Asians)  _  54.88%
Notes:  Average  'effective' years  of schooling  for persons  ten years  or older,  in urban  areas.
Labor  Force  Participation  in urban areas  only.
As for labour force participation, the persistent and substantial increase in female participation
from 29% to 42% over the two decades, was partly mitigated by a decline in male participation
rates. Those trends notwithstanding, the male-female participation gap remains high, at around
30 percentage points. There is little evidence of differential labour force participation across
ethnic groups.
" See Duryea and Szekely (1998) for such an educational cohort analysis of Brazil and other Latin American13
3.  The Model and the Decomposition  Methodology
Let us now turn to the Brazilian version of the general semi-reduced-form  model for household
income and labor supply in Bourguignon et. al. (1998). It is used here to investigate the evolution
of the distribution of household incomes per capita over the two decades from the mid- 1970s to
the mid-1990s. Specifically, we analyze the distributions of  1976, 1981, 1985 and 1996, and
simulate changes between them. The paper covers only Brazil's urban areas (which account for
some three quarters of its population). The general model therefore collapses to two occupational
sectors:  wage earners and self-employed  in urban areas." 2
Total household income is given by:
(  1  )  n  n
(1)  Y+>wL  Vi,,Le  +YOh
Where w; are the total wage earnings of individual i, LW  is a dummy variable that takes the value
one if individual i is a wage earner (and zero otherwise); Ti is the self-employment profit of
individual i: L" is a dummy that takes the value one if individual i is self-employed (and zero
otherwise); and  Y 0 is  income from any  other sources, such as transfer or capital  incomes.
Equation I is not estimated econometrically.  It aggregates infornation on right-hand-side term I
(from equations 2 and 4), 2 (from equations 3 and 4) and 3 directly from the household data set.
The wage-earnings  equation is given by:
(2)  Logw, =  Xi  7W±  + eW
countries.
12 We will eventually extend the model to cover rural areas too, by incorporating  two additional sectors: wage
earners and self-employed in the rural areas. In Brazil, wage earners include employees with or without formal
documentation ('com ou sem carteira'). The self-employed are own-account  workers ('conta propria').14
where  Xi  =  (ed,  ed2, exp, exp2 , Dg  ).  Ed denotes completed effective years of schooling.
Experience (exp) is defined simply as: age - education - 6, since a more desirable definition
would require the age when a person first entered employment, a variable which is not available
for 1976.13  Dg is a gender dummy, which takes the value 1 for females (and zero for males). wi
are the monthly earnings of individual i. This extremely simple specification was chosen so as to
make the simulation stage of the decomposition feasible, as described below. It embodies the
assumptions that the Brazilian labor market was not segmented by region, firm size, race, or any
attribute other than gender.
Analogously, the self-employed  earnings equation is given by:
(3)  Logg7,  = XPf8se + gse
Equations 2 and 3 are estimated by simple OLS. Equation (2) is estimated for all employees,
whether or not heads of household, and whether with or without formal sector documentation
(com or sem carteira). Equation 3 is estimated for all self-employed individuals (whether or not
heads of households). Because the errors s are unlikely to be independent from the exogenous
variables, a sample selection bias correction procedure might be used. However, the standard
Heckmnan  procedure for sample selection bias correction requires equally strong assumptions
about  the  orthogonality between the  error  terms  E  and  ,  (from  the  occupational  choice
multinomial logit below). The assumptions required to validate OLS estimation of (2) and (3) are
not more demanding than those required to validate the results of the Heckman procedure.  We
assume, therefore, that all errors are independently distributed, and do not correct for sample
selection bias in the earnings regressions.
We now turn to the labor force participation model. Because we have a two-sector labor market
(segmented into the wage employment and self-employment sectors), labor force participation
and the choice of sector (occupational choice), could be treated in two different ways. One could
13 Given  the fact  that  education  is given  by the last  grade completed,  and is thus net of repetition,  this definition  will
overestimate  the experience  of those  who repeated  grades  at school,  and  hence  bias  the experience  coefficient
downwards.  The  numbers  involved  are not substantial  to alter  any conclusions  on trends.15
assume that  the choices are sequential, with a  participation decision  independent from  the
occupational choice, and the latter conditional on the former. This approach, which would be
compatible with a sequential probit estimation, was deemed less satisfactory than one in which
individuals face a single three-way choice, between staying out of the labor force, working as
employees, or in self-employment.  Such a choice can be estimated by a multinomial logit model.
According to that specification,  the probability of being in state s (  0, w, se) is given by:
ezir,
(4)  Pj  where s, j = (0, w, se)
ezi,r +le  Zr  yj
j*s
where the explanatory variables differ for household heads and other household members, by
assumption, as follows. For household heads:
x I  -;nO-13  nl4-65, n, 65 E  D14-65ed,  1  D 1 4-65ed  ]DI4-65age,
h  b14-65  -I  n14-65  -I  14-65  -I
G,_,4-65  age,-E  D,4 -65Gd,  D
n,4-65  -1  n,4-65  -1
For other members of the household:
XjP;n  n,  n_6,>65,  YD,4  6,ed,  'ED 46ed]  D46ae
Zh0  13fl 14 -65 nf> 5 n,  D 14-65ed  n  D14-65agej zh=  1l4-65  -i  nl4-65  -i  -i4-65  -i
Dl4-65ge:  s  D,  6Gd,  D,s, Ll w, D
1l4-65  1in4-65  -i
Where nk., is the number of persons in the households whose age falls between k and m; D,465  iS
a dummy that takes the value one for individuals whose age is between  14 and 65; DS' is a
dummy for a self-employed head, the penultimate term is the earnings of a wage-earning head;
and D is a dummy variable that takes the value one if there are no individuals aged 14-65 in the
household. The sums defined over {j } are sums over {Vi E  h / j }.16
The multinomial logit model in (4) corresponds to the following discrete choice process:
(5)  s=Argmax{Uj=Zhy+±,,j  =  (O,w,se)}
where Z is given above, separately for household heads and other members; the tj are random
variables with a double exponential density function and Uj may be interpreted as the utility of
alternative j.  Once the  vector yj is estimated by (4), and  a  random term  , is  drawn, each
individual chooses an occupation  j so as to maximize the above utility function.
A Decomposition  of Changes in the Distribution of Household Incomel 4
Once equations 2, 3 and 4 have been estimated, we have two vectors of parameters for each of
the four years in our sample (t E (1976, 1981, 1985, 1996}): Pt  from the earnings equations for
both  wage  earners  and  the  self-employed (including constant  terms  cc), and  y, from  the
participation equation. In addition, from equation 1, we have Yoht  and Yht.  Let Xht :={XP,  ZIh | Vi
e  h} and Qb  :  {gwi,  Se.i  &i  Ii E h }. We can then write the total income of household h at time t
as follows:
(6)  Yht  =H(Xht  ~Yohti  Qht;  ft  SYt)  h=l, .. ,m
Based on this representation, the distribution of household incomes:
(7)  Dt =  {Yi,, Y 2t, ...-- Ymt  }
can be rewritten as:
(8)  D, = D[{Xh,YOhtYQh,  }3hA,Yr,]
Where  {.}  refers  to  the joint  distribution  of  the  corresponding variables  over  the  whole
population.
We are interested in understanding the evolution of Dt over time, or possibly that of a set of
alternative summary  poverty or inequality measures defined over it.17
The decompositions proposed in this project consist of estimating the effects of changing one or
more of the arguments of D[.  on Dt. The simplest decomposition applies to those arguments
which are exogenous to the household: that is, the fis, ~S,  and the variance of the various residual
terms. Changing the fis amounts to assuming a change in the rate of return on human capital
variables in equation (2) and (3). We refer to this as a "price effect". In algebraic terms, it can be
expressed as:
(9)  B=  D[{Xh,,  Yohm  ' 0  ht  } lA,  ]  D[{Xh,D Yoht,Qh,  }  rfit,  ]
This expression measures the contribution to the overall change in the distribution Dt' - Dt of a
change in ,l between t and t', holding all else constant. Likewise, the "labor supply effect" may
be defined by:
(10)  L,,.  = D[{XhtYihD  I  Y  ht  },fi,  7rt  ]- D[{Xh, X  YohtQht  }'  fit  r]
The price effect Btt'  is obtained by comparing the distribution at date t with the hypothetical
distribution obtained  by  simulating on the  population observed  at date  t  the  remuneration
structure of period t'.  A price effect can be computed individually - that is, for one element of
the vector f3,  or collectively - that is, for all elements of the vector P. Both types of simulations
are reported below.
Likewise, the labor supply effect, Ltt', is obtained by comparing the initial distribution with the
hypothetical distribution  obtained by  simulating on  the  population  observed  at  date  t  the
occupational preferences observed at date t'.  Again, a  labor-supply effect can be  computed
individually - that is, for one element of the vector y, or collectively - that is, for all elements of
the vector y. We only report collective labor-supply decompositions in this paper.
'4 This  section  draws  heavily  on Bourguignon  et. al. (1998),  adapting  it to our  specifications.18
Considering only the collective price and labor supply effects, one can then write the change in
the distribution of household income as the sum of a price effect, a labor supply effect and a
residual:
(I11)  Di - D,, =  B,t.  +  L,t.  +R,,,
The residual Rt. measures the contribution to the change in the distribution of income of  changes
in the distributions of observable and unobservable characteristics, respectively all the Xhs and
YOhs,  and  all the es and q7.
(11) is  a  definitionally exact  decomposition, but  changes in  the  residual  term  R,,  which
encompass all changes in household physical and human capital endowments, changes in the
receipts of non-labour incomes, such as capital income or transfers, and demographic changes,
are likely to be important. In order to shed light on some of those effects, one must mind the fact
that of the variables in  {Xht, YOi  Qht},  only the residual terms in  Qht  are (by assumption)
orthogonal to all other variables. For any other variable, i.e. elements of the X and Y vectors, a
change in  distribution must be understood conditionally on all other observable characteristics.
Specifically, if we are interested in the effect of a change in the distribution of a single specific
variable Xk on the distribution of household incomes between times t and t',  it is first necessary
to identify the distribution of Xk conditional on other relevant characteristics X.k (and possibly
other incomes Y.). This can be done by regressing Xk  on X kat dates t and t', as follows:
(12)  Xki = Xk  ,PI  + Ukit
where k is the variable, i is the individual, and t is the date. The vector of residuals ukit  represents
the effects of unobservable characteristics  (assumed to be orthogonal to X ,  on Xk.  The vector zt
is a vector of coefficients capturing the dependency of Xk  on the true exogenous variables Xk, at
time t. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the error terms u are normally distributed
with mean zero and a common standard deviation at.19
The same equation can, of course, be estimated at date t',  generating a corresponding vector of
coefficients ptw,  and a standard error of the residuals given by a,,. We are then ready to simulate
the effect of a change in the conditional distribution of Xk from t to t',  by replacing the observed
values of Xki,  in the sample observed at time t, with:
(13)  X *ki,  = X_k,t  ' + Ukil
at
The contribution of the change in  the distribution of  the variable Xk  to  the change in the
distribution of incomes between t an t' may now be written as:
(14)  Rx*  =D[{X,,  , X  Y  ,YOh,1,ahA}  rJ-DY  ]  D[{XkLk,X  ki}iJkit.YQhA,5r 1
In this paper, we perform four regression estimations such as (13), and hence four simulations
such as (14). The four variables estimated are Xk  =  {n 0 1 3, n14 6 5, n> 65, ed). In the case of the
education regression, the vector of explanatory variables X-d, was (1, age, age 2,  Gd, regional
dummies). In the case of the regressions with the numbers of household members in certain age
intervals as dependent variables, the vector X-kit  was (1, age, age 2, ed, ed 2, regional dummies),
where age and education are those of the household head. The simulations permitted by these
estimations allow us to investigate the effects of the evolution of the distribution of educational
attainment and of demographic structure on the distribution of income. We now turn to  the
results of the estimation stage of the model.
4.  Estimating the Model
The results of the OLS estimation of equation (2) for wage earners (formal and informal) are
shown in Table 5 below.  The static results are not surprising. All variables are significant and
have the expected signs. The coefficients on education and its square are positive and significant.
The effect of experience (defined as [age - education - 6]), is positive but concave. The gender
dummy (female =1) is negative, significant and large.20
The dynamics are more interesting. Between 1976 and  1996, the earnings-education profile
changed shape. After rising in the late 1970s, the linear component fell substantially from 1981
to 1996. Meanwhile, the coefficient of squared years of schooling fell to 1981 but then more than
doubled to  1996, ending the  period substantially above its  initial  1976 value.  Overall, the
relationship became more convex, suggesting a steepening of marginal returns to education at
high  levels.  However, plotting  the  parabola which  models  the  partial  earnings-education
relationship from equation (2), the lowering of the linear term dominates. The profile shifts up
from 1976 to 1981, and again to 1985, before falling precipitously (while convexifying) to 1996.
See figure 4.  The net effect across the entire period was a fall in the cumulative returns to
education (from zero to t years) for the entire range. This co-existed with increasing marginal
returns at high levels of education. The implications for poverty and inequality are clear, with the
education price effect leading to an increase in the former and a decline in the latter.
Year  1976  1981  1985  1996
Intercept  4.350  4.104  3.877  4.256
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Education  0.123  0.136  0.129  0.080
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Education 2 0.225  0.181  0.283  0.438
(x 100)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Experience  0.075  0.085  0.087  0.062
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Experience 2 -0.105  -0.119  -0.121  -0.080
(x 100)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Gender  -0.638  -0.590  -0.635  -0.493
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
_______________  0.525  0.538  0.547  0.474
Source: Authors' calculations  based on the "Pesquisa  Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios"  (PNAD).
P-values in parentheses.
[See Figure 4 in Appendix 4]21
Returns to experience also increased from 1976 to 1981, and from 1981 to 1985, with a concave
pattern and a maximum at around 35 years of experience. See Figure 5 below. But from 1985 to
1996, there was a substantial decline in cumulative returns to experience, even with respect to
1976, until 50 years of experience. The relationship became less concave, and the maximum
returns moved up to  around 40 years. Over the entire period, the experience price effect was
mildly unequalizing, and seriously poverty increasing.
[See Figure 5 in Appendix 41
The one piece of good news comes from a reduction in the male-female earnings disparity. While
female earnings, controlling for both education and experience, remained substantially lower in
all four years, suggesting that some labour market discrimination may be at work, there was
nevertheless a decline in the this effect between 1976 and 1996. This effect, as we will see from
the simulations reported in Section 5, was both mildly equalizing and poverty reducing.
Let us now turn to Equation (3), which seeks to explain the earnings of the self-employed with
the same set of independent variables as Equation (2). The results are reported in Table 6 below.
This  table reveals that  education is  also  an  important determinant of  incomes in  the  self-
employment sector. The coefficient on the linear term has a higher value in all years than for
wage-earners,  but the quadratic term is lower. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the return to low
levels of education might be higher in self-employment  than in wage work, but would eventually
become lower as years of schooling increase. This will clearly have an impact on occupational
choice, estimated through equation (4). Dynamically, the same trend was observed as for wage-
earners: the coefficient on the linear term fell over time, but  the relationship became more
convex.' 5 The coefficients on experience and experience squared follow a similar pattern to that
observed for wage earners, as shown in Figure 5. Once again, the cumulative return to experience
fell over the bulk of the range from  1976 to  1996, contributing to the observed increase in
poverty. The effect of being female, ceteris paribus, is even more markedly negative in this
sector than in the wage sector. It also fell from 1976 to 1996, despite a temporary increase in
disparity in the 1980s.
15 In this case,  it actually  switched  from  concave  to convex.22
....  ,..  ...... Table  6:Euain 3:-Total  Earing  Regeso  for the self  employed--
Year  1976  1981  1985  1996
Intercept  4.319  4.192  3.853  4.250
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Education  0.196  0.148  0.165  0.114
______________  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Education 2 -0.206  0.021  0.012  0.219
(x 100)  (0.0001)  (0.4892)  (0.6545)  (0.0001)
Experience  0.074  0.079  0.084  0.063
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Experience 2 -0.101  -0.108  -0.111  -0.082
(x 100)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Gender  -1.092  -1.148  -1.131  -0.714
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
______________  0.431  0.434  0.438  0.336
Source:  Authors' calculations based on the "Pesquisa  Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios" (PNAD).
P-values in parentheses.
Let us now turn to the estimation of the multinomial logit in equation (4). This was estimated
separately for household heads and for others, since the set of explanatory variables was slightly
different in each case (see the description of vectors Z, and Z 1 in Section 2 above). Table A3.1 in
Appendix 3 presents the  results for household heads,  and Table  A3.2 for other household
members. In both tables, the results are presented as the effects of other choices versus that of
remaining outside the labor force ('unoccupied').
For household heads, education was not significantly related to the likelihood of choosing to
work in the wage sector vis-a-vis staying out of the labor force, at any time. In addition, the
positive effect of education decreased from 1976 to  1996, to the point where it was no longer
statistically significant. The dominant effect on the occupational choices of urban household
heads over this period, however, was a  substantial decline in the constant term affecting the
probability of participating in either productive sector, as opposed to remaining outside the23
labour force, or in unemployment. Since it is captured by the constant, this effect is not related to
the educational or experience characteristics of the head, or to the endowments of his or her
household. We interpret it, instead, as the effect of  labour market demand side conditions,
leading to reduced participation in paid work. This effect will be shown, in the occupational
choice simulations reported in the next section, to be both unequalizing and immiserizing .
For other members of the household, education did seem to raise the probability of choosing
wage work vis-a-vis staying out of the labour force, with the relationship changing from concave
to  convex (and  weak)  over  the  period. It  also  enhanced the  probability of  being  in  self
employment  vis-A-vis  outside the labor force in both periods, although this relationship remained
concave. The number of children in the household significantly discouraged participation in both
sectors, although more so in the wage-earning one. The change in the constant term was much
smaller than for household heads, suggesting that negative labour market conditions hurt primary
earners to a greater extent. Consequently, we will observe the effect of the occupational choices
of other household members on poverty and inequality to be much milder than those of the
heads. This is in contrast to other countries where similar methodologies  have been applied, such
as Taiwan, where changes in spouse (and particularly women) labour force participation rates
had important consequences for the distribution of incomes (See Bourguignon et. al., 1997).
Table A3.3 in Appendix 2 reports the results of the estimation of equation (12), with education of
individuals ten years old or older as the dependent variable, regressed against the vector (1, age,
age 2, Gd, regional dummies). Over time, there is a  considerable increase in the value of the
intercept, which will yield higher predicted values for educational attainment, controlling for age,
gender and regional location. Additionally, the gender dummy went from large and negative to
positive  and significant, suggesting that  women have  more than  caught up  with  males  in
educational attainment in Brazil over the last twenty years. The effect of individual age is stable,
and regional disparities, with the South and Southeast ahead of the three central and northern
regions, persist.24
Tables A3.4 - A3.6 report the results of regressing the number of household members in the age
interval 0-13; 14-65; and above 65 (respectively), on the vector (1, ed, ed 2, age, age 2, regional
dummies). The main finding here is that the schooling of the head has a large, negative and
significant effect on the demand for children, so that as education levels rise, family sizes would
tend to fall, ceteris paribus. Additionally, some degree of convergence across regions in family
size can be inferred, with the positive 1976 regional dummy coefficients for all regions (with
respect to the Southeast) declining over time, and more than halving in value to  1996. This
picture suggests a possibly important transformation in Brazil's  demographic structure, with
potential implications for welfare. As we will see in the next section, the role of observed
reductions of family size was indeed crucial.
5.  The Simulation Results.
Having estimated earnings equations for both sectors of the model (wage-earners (2) and the self-
employed  (3));  participation equations  for  both  household  heads  and  non-heads  (4);  and
'endowment'  equations  (13)  for  the  exogenous  determination  of  education  and  family
composition we are now in a position to carry out the decompositions described in equations (9),
(10) and (14). These simulations, as discussed above, are carried out for the entire distribution (as
in equations 7 and 8). However, the results are summarized below in Table 7, 8 and 9, which
report mean household per capita income pt(y), four inequality indices (the Gini coefficient, the
Theil-L index [E(0)], the Theil-T index [E(l)], and E(2)), and the standard three members of the
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke  class of poverty measures, P(a), a  = 0, 1, 2, computed with respect to
two monthly poverty lines: an indigence line of R$30 and a poverty line of R$60 (both expressed
in 1996 RM Sao Paulo prices).25
Table  7: Simulated  Poverty  and Inequality  for 1976, Using  1996 coefficients.
Mean  Inequality  Poverty
__  _____________________  p/c  ________  Z = R$30 / month  Z = R$  60 / month
Income  Gini  E(0)  E(1)  E(2)  P(0)  P(1)  P(2)  - P(0)  P(1)  P(2)
1976  observed  265.101  0.595  0.648  0.760  2.657  0.0681  0.0211  0.0105  0.2209  0.0830  0.0428
1996  observed  276.460  0.591  0.586  0.694  1.523  0.0922  0.0530  0.0434  0.2176  0.1029  0.0703
Price  Effects
a,  1 for wage earners  218.786  0.598  0.656  0.752  - 2.161  _  0.0984  0.0304  00.0141 _  0.2876  0.1129  0.0596
a,  1  for self-employed  250.446  0.597  0.658  0.770  2.787  0.0788  0.0250  0.0121  0.2399  0.0932  0.0490
=,a  for both  204.071  0.598  -6  0.655  .i754  =2.90  0.1114  0.0357  0.0169  0.3084  0.1249  0.0673
a only, for both  233.837  0.601  0.664  0.774  2.691  0.0897  0.0275  0.0129  0.2688  0.1040  0.0545
All  1B  (but no a) for both  216.876  0.593  0.644  0.736  2.055  0.0972  0.0303  0.0143T-  0.2837  0.1114  0.0590
Education  ,B  for both  232.830  0.593  0.639  0.759  2.691  0.0779  0.0234  0.0110  0.2531  0.0953  0.0488
Experience 1  for both  240.618  0.600  0.664  0.771  2.694  0.0851  0.0265  0.0125  _  0.2592  0.1000  0.0525
Gender P for both  270.259  0.595  0.649  0.751  2.590  0.0650  0.0191  0.0090  _  0.2160  0.0797  0.0404
Occupational  Choice Effects
y for both  sectors (and both  260.323  0.609  0.650  0.788  2.633  _  0.0944  0.0451  0.0331  _0.2471  0.1082  0.0671
heads  + others)
y for both  sectors (only for  265.643  0.598  0.6  57  0.57  2.482  0.0721  0.0231  0.0119  -0 0.2274  0.0867  0.0454
other members)  I
_y,  a, 1  for both sectors  202.325  0.610  0.649  0.788  2.401  0.1352  0.0597  0.0402  0.3248  0.1466  0.0902
Demographic  Patterns
_  ,ud only, for all  277.028  0.574  0.585  0.704  2.432  0.0365  0.0113  0.0063  - 0.1711  0.0554  0.0264
__,ud,  y, ac,  ,B,  for all  210.995  0.587  0.577  0.727  2.177  0.0931  0.0433  0.0321  - 0.2724  0.1129  0.0677
Education  Endowment  Effects  393  54  0  _04  0  6  0
e only, for  339.753  0.594  0.650  0.740  2.485  0.0424  0.0136  0.0073  0.1593  0.0567-  0.0287
[  id, [Le for all  353.248  0.571  0.584  0.688  2.320  0.0225  0.0078  0.0049  0.1131  0.0359  0.0173
1.te, pd,  y, oc, 3,B  for all  263.676  0.594  0.600  0.727  1.896  0.0735  0.0374  0.0296  =0.2204  0.0913  0.0561
Source:  Based  on "Pesquisa  Nacional  por  Amostra  de Domicilios"  (PNAD)  of 1976  and 1996. 
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Table 8: Simulated Poverty and Inequality for 1981, Using 1996 coefficients.
Mean  Inequality  Poverty
P/c  Z = R$30 / month  Z=R$ 60/
month
Income  Gini  E(0)  E(1)  E(2)  P(0)  P(1)  P(2)  P(0)  P(1)  P(2)
_1981  observed  239.075  0.561  0.542  0.610  1.191  0.0710  0.0321  0.0230 _  0.2133  0.0862  0.0509
1996 observed  276.460  0.591  0.586  0.694  1.523  0.0922  0.0530  0.0434  0.2176  0.1029  0.0703
Income  Generation
a, 1 for wage  earners  203.978  0.563  0.546  0.624  1.288  0.0925  0.0383  0.0258  0.2648  0.1081  0.0628
_a,  , for self-employed  236.511  0.564  0.554  0.618  1.216  0.0772  0.0342  0.0241 _  0.2229  0.0915  0.0542
a, p for both  201.262  0.568  0.557  0.636  1.325  0.0987  0.0405  0.0269 _  0.2750  0.1135  0.0662
a only,  for both  226.751  0.560  0.541  0.608  1.203 _  0.0774  0.0340  0.0240 _  0.2300  0.0927  0.0545
_  All ,  (but no  a) for both  184.150  0.574  0.571  0.656  1.411 _  0.1179  0.0474  0.0302 _  0.3126  0.1320  0.0772
Education  P for both  206.439  0.554  0.523  0.603  1.232  - 0.0812  0.0351  0.0245 - 0.2463  0.0984  0.0571
Experience  1  for both  201.805  0.570  0.566  0.637  1.301  0.1029  0.0427  0.0282 _  0.2784  0.1169  0.0687_
Gender  P for both  244.918  0.558  0.538  0.602  1.168  0.0676  0.0310  0.0225  0.2052  0.0829  0.0490
Occupational  Choice
r for both sectors  (and both 235.636  0.570  0.548  0.629  1.234  0.0907  0.0479  0.0374 -0.2344  0.1044  0.0675
heads  + others)
y for both sectors  (only  for  240.013  0.564  0.552  0.614  1.195  - 0.0756  0.0342  0.0244 _  0.2207  0.0903  0.0537
other  members)
Y=  a,  (1  for both sectors  200.559  0.579  0.566  0.663  1.393  0.1172  0.0562  0.0412 _  0.2925  0.1307  0.0823
Demographic  Patterns
Ld  only,  for all  247.443  0.544  0.496  0.573  1.093  _  0.0529  0.0275  0.0219  0.1745  0.0688  0.0416
_p4,r,  a, 13,  for all  207.243  0.560  0.513  0.617  1.256  0.0874  0.0455  0.0359  0.2486  0.1056  0.0663
Education 
_____
p_  0only,  for all  298.677  0.582  0.592  0.663  1.325  _  0.0610  0.0300  0.0231  0.1779  0.0735  0.0450
pd, p.  for all  310.762  0.569  0.552  0.634  1.248  0.0448  0.0251  0.0208  0.1426  0.0574  0.0361
Jie,  id  , rY,  a, 13,  for all  255.032  0.586  0.572  0.681  1.390  _  0.0775  0.043  1  0.0352 j  0.2155  0.0938  0.0607
Source: Based on "Pesquisa Nacional por  Amostra de Domicilios" (PNAD) of 1981 and 1996.  l  l  l  l  l  l  l27
Table 9: Simulated Poverty and Inequality for 1985, Using 1996 coefficients.
Mean  Inequality  Poverty
p/c  Z = R$30 / month  _  Z = R$ 60 / month
Income  Gini  E(O)  E(l)  E(2)  P(0)  P(1)  P(2)  P(0)  P(l)  P(2)
1985 observed  243.152  0.575  0.588  0.654  1.432  0.0738  0.0307  0.0205  0.2258  0.0901  0.0514
1996 observed  276.460  0.591  0.586  0.694  1.523  _  0.0922  0.0530  0.0434  0.2176  0.1029  0.0703
Income Generation
cX,  ,  for wage earners  221.944  0.563  0.557  0.631  1.403  0.0758  0.0306  0.0203  0.2353  0.0929  0.0524
cc, f3  for self-employed  241.405  0.572  0.58  1  0.647  1.392  0.0725  0.0299  0.0200  0.2236  0.0887  0.0504
a, 1 for both  220.421  0.560  0.549  0.625  1.380  0.0744  0.0299  0.0198  0.2332  0.0915  0.0514
a only, for both  265.972  0.569  0.575  0.636  1.343  0.0599  0.0262  0.0184  0.1936  0.0758  0.0434
All  ,  (but no a) for both  170.654  0.582  0.597  0.698  1.754  0.1308  0.0494  0.0291  0.3484  0.1467  0.0838
Education 13  for both  199.652  0.562  0.552  0.637  1.473  0.0864  0.0343  0.0221  0.2659  0.1054  0.0592
Experience f for both  217.070  0.579  0.594  0.666  1.472  0.1049  0.0521  0.0388  0.2651  0.1189  0.0754
Gender P for both  249.474  0.573  0.583  0.647  1.381  _  0.0698  0.0290  0.0196  0.2160  0.0855  0.0487
Occupational  Choice
y for both sectors (and both  237.069  0.591  0.630  0.690  1.502  0.1048  0.0532  0.0398  0.2577  0.1176  0.0756
heads + others)
y for both sectors (only for  241.081  0.580  0.603  0.663  1.422  0.0833  0.0344  0.0228  0.2391  0.0982  0.0568
other members)
y, a, f for both sectors  217.070  0.579  0.594  0.666  1.472  0.1049  0.0521  0.0388  0.2651  0.1189  0.0754
Demographic Patterns
,u only, for all  275.264  0.573  0.583  0.702  2.420  0.0368  0.0114  0.0063  0.1724  0.0558  0.0266
>,  r,  a,d,  for all  210.838  0.599  0.605  0.761  2.335  0.0997  0.0462  0.0339  0.2910  0.1215  0.0726
Education
_p.  only, for all  281.427  0.587  0.614  0.680  1.451  0.0648  0.0293  0.0209  _  0.1985  0.0800  0.0469
_ , p[.  for all  292.292  0.579  0.588  0.662  1.385  0.0498  0.0246  0.0188  0.1718  _0.0659  0.0386
p.t,  .d, r, cx,  1P,  for all  254.675  0.580  0.590  0.666  1.410  0.0774  0.0434  0.0348  0.2151  0.0937  0.0606
Source: Based on "Pesquisa Nacional por  Amostra de Domicilios" (PNAD) of 1985 and 1996.  = 28
Tables 7 - 9 contain a great wealth of information about a large number of simulated economic
changes, always by bringing combinations  of 1996 coefficients to the populations of 1976, 1981
and 1985. In order to address the two puzzles posed in the Introduction - namely the increase in
extreme urban poverty between 1976 and 1996 despite (sluggish) growth and (mildly) reducing
inequality; and the coexistence of a deteriorating labour market with stable 'headline' poverty -
we now  focus on  a  comparison of  1976 and  1996. To  do  so,  we plot  differences in  the
(logarithms) of incomes between the simulated distribution and that observed for  1976, for a
number of the simulations in Table 7  16
Figure 6 below plots the combined price effects (aX  and 0), separately for wage-earners and the
self-employed. As  can be  seen, these effects were negative (i.e. would have implied lower
income in 1976) for all percentiles. The losses were greater for wage earners than for the self-
employed and, for the latter, were regressive. These losses are exactly what one would have
expected from the downward shifts of the partial earnings-education and earnings-experience
profiles, shown in Figures 4 and 5.
[See Figure 6 in Appendix 41
In Figure 7, we adopt a different tack to the price effects, by plotting the income differences for
each individual price effect simulation (for both sectors combined), and then aggregating them.
As  we  would  expect  from  figure  6,  the  returns  to  education  and  experience  are  both
immiserizing. The change in partial returns to education alone is mildly equalizing (as can be
seen from table 7). The change in the partial returns to experience are unequalizing, as well as
being immiserizing. The change in the intercept, calculated at the mean values of the independent
variables, was also negative throughout. This proxies for a 'pure growth' effect, capturing effects
on earnings from processes not captured by education, experience, gender, or the unobserved
characteristics  of individual workers. It is intended to capture the effects of capital accumulation,
managerial and technical innovation, macroeconomic policy conditions, and other factors likely
to determine economic growth, not included explicitly in the Mincerian equation. Its negative
16 In computing  these  differences,  we compare  the percentiles  of the two different  distributions  described  above.  A
different,  but equally  interesting  exercise,  is to compare  the percentiles  of the simulated  distribution  ranked  as in the
observed  1976  distribution,  with that 1976  distribution.  These  exercises  were  also  performed,  but are not reported29
effect in this simulation suggests that these factors were immiserizing in urban Brazil, over the
period.
[See Figure 7 in Appendix 4]
The one piece of good news, once again, comes from the gender simulation, which reports a
poverty-reducing effect, as a result of the decline in male-female earnings differentials captured
in Tables 5 and 6. This effect was far, however, from being sufficient to offset the combined
negative effects of the other price effects. As the thick line at the bottom of Figure 7 indicates,
the combined effect of imposing the 1996 parameters of the two Mincerian equations on the
1976 population was substantially immiserizing. Figure 8 below reiterates this point, separating
the 'growth'  effect (associated with a simple oc simulation), from the combined relative price
effects (associated with a joint  simulation of the vector 1).  Note that, when combined in this
form, the real price effect is on average incomes (and hence on poverty, but not so much on
inequality). An inspection of the rows on table 7 confirms  this observation.
[See Figure 8 in Appendix 4]
Figure 9 plots the (logarithm) of the income differences between the distribution which arises
from imposing the 1996 occupational choice parameters (the y vector from the multinomial logit
in Equation 4) on the 1976 population, and the observed 1976 distribution. It does so both for all
individuals (the lower line), and for non-heads (the upper line). The effect of this  simulated
change  in  occupational  choice  and  labour  force  participation  behaviour  is  both  highly
immiserizing and unequalizing, as an inspection of the relevant indices in table 7 confirms. It
suggest the existence of a group of people who, by voluntarily or involuntarily leaving the labour
force, or entering unemployment, or being consigned to very ill-remunerated occupations (likely)
in the informal sector, are becoming increasingly impoverished. In the unfavourable conditions
of the Brazilian urban labour market of these two decades, which we have just  documented
above, these are people who appear to be failing to climb the slippery slope, and are becoming
trapped in extreme poverty.
due to space constraints. In any case, the plots which are presented are those which correspond to the summary
statistics  presented in tables 7-9.30
[See Figure 9 in Appendix 4]
Combining the negative price and occupational choice effects, one gains a sense of the overall
effect of Brazil's urban labour market conditions over this period. This is done graphically in
Figure 10, where the lowest curve plots the differences between the incomes from a distribution
in which all as, Ps and ys change, and the observed 1976 distribution. It shows the substantially
poverty-augmenting (and unequalizing) combined effect of changes in labour market prices and
occupational choice parameters on the 1976 distribution.
[See Figure 10 Appendix 4]
At this point, the second puzzle can be stated clearly: given these labour market circumstances
what factors can account for the facts that mean incomes rose, headline poverty did not rise, and
inequality appears to have fallen slightly? The first part of the answer is shown graphically in
Figure  11, where the  upper  line plots  the  differences between  the  (log)  incomes  from  a
distribution arising from imposing on the  1976 population the  transformation (13)  for the
demographic structure of the population. The changes in the parameters p
td (and in the variances
of the residuals in the  corresponding regression) have a positive  effect on incomes for  all
percentiles, and in an equalizing manner. However, when combined in a simulation in which the
values of all as,  P3s  and ys also change, it can be seen that the positive demographic effect is still
overwhelmed. Nevertheless, it is clear that the reduction in dependency ratios, and subsequently
in  family sizes, in urban Brazil  over this period had  an  important mitigating effect on the
distribution of incomes. This can be seen clearly in Figure 12, where the bottom line from Figure
11, which incorporates the demographic effect, is superimposed on the simulations that exclude
it, from the changes in labour market parameters only. The line incorporating the demographic
effects lies essentially everywhere above the line for all as,  Ps and ys only, indicating a smaller
loss  in  incomes  everywhere. Note,  however,  that  while  this  relative  gain  is  particularly
pronounced for the 'quasi-poor'  (say, from the 5t"  to the 25  percentile), it is less pronounced
below that level, where the new extreme poor are located.
[See Figures 11 and 12 in Appendix 4]31
There remains one final piece of the puzzle, necessary to explain why the deterioration in labour
market conditions did not have a worse impact on poverty. That, as should be evident from the
increase in mean years of effective schooling, registered in Table 1, is the rightward shift in the
distribution function of education. This  is shown in Figure  13, which reveals that  gains in
educational attainment were particularly pronounced at lower  levels of  education, and thus
presumably among the poor.
[See Figure 13 in Appendix 4]
A gain in educational endowments across the income distribution, but particularly among the
poor, has both direct and indirect effects on incomes. The direct effects are through equations (2)
and (3), where earnings are positive functions of schooling. The indirect effects are both through
the occupational choices that individuals make, and through the further impact that education has
on reducing the demand for children, and hence family size. A  simulation of the effect of
education is thus quite complex. After it is completed, one observes, in Figure 14, a rather flat
improvement in (log) incomes across the distribution (i.e. a scaling effect). However, when this
is combined with changes in the parameters of the demographic equations again, the effect gains
strength, and becomes not only more poverty-reducing,  abut also mildly equalizing. The bottom
line in Figure 14, in keeping with the pattern, combines both of these effects with the changing
cas,  P3s  and ys. The result is striking: this complex combined simulation suggests that all of these
effects, during twenty turbulent years, cancel out almost exactly from the 159 percentile up.
Hence the small changes in headline poverty. However, from around the 12' percentile down, the
simulation suggests a prevalence of the negative occupational choice (and to a lesser extent,
price) effects, with substantial income losses. These account for the rise in indigence captured by
the R$30/month poverty line.
[See Figure 14 in Appendix 41
The bottom line in Figure 14 is, in a sense, the final attempt by this methodology to simulate the
various changes that led from the 1976 to 1996 distribution. Figure 15 is a graphical test of the
approach. Here, the line denoted "1996-1976" plots the differences in  actual (log) incomes32
between the observed 1996 and the observed 1976 distributions. Along with it, we have also
plotted every (cumulative) stage of our simulations. First the immiserizing (but roughly equal)
price effects; then these combined with the highly immiserizing occupational choice effects; then
the slightly less bleak picture arising from a combination of the latter with the parameters of the
family size equations. And finally, the curve plotting the differences between the incomes from
the simulation with all parameters changing, and observed 1976. As can be seen, it would not
appear that the last line replicates the actual differences badly. Of course, the point of the
exercise is not to replicate the actual changes perfectly, but rather to learn the different effects of
different parameters, and possibly to infer any policy implications from them. But the success of
the last simulation in  approximately matching the actual changes does provide some  extra
confidence in the methodology, and in any lessons we may derive from it.
[See Figure 15 in Appendix 4]
7.  Conclusions
In the end, does this exercise help us improve our understanding of the evolution of Brazil's
urban income distribution over this  turbulent twenty-year period? Whereas many traditional
analysts of income distribution dynamics might have inferred, from the small changes in mean
income, in  various inequality indices, and  in poverty incidence 1",  that  there was little - if
anything - to investigate, digging a little deeper has unearthed a wealth of economic factors
interacting  to  determine substantial  changes in  the  environment faced  by  individuals  and
families, and in their responses.
In particular, we have found that, despite a  small fall in measured inequality (although the
Lorenz curves cross as expected, see Figure 2b) and a small increase in mean income, extreme
poverty  has  increased, for  sufficiently low poverty  lines  or  sufficiently  poverty  aversion
parameters. This seems to have been caused by outcomes related to participation decisions and
occupational choices, in combination with declines in the labour market returns to education and
experience. These changes are associated with greater unemployment and informality, as one
would expect, but  more research into them seems necessary. While we seem to have identified
the existence a group excluded from both the productive labour markets and any substantive
17 With respect  to the already  low R$ 60/month  poverty  line, by historical  standards  for Brazil.33
form of safety net, we have not been able to fully interpret the determinants of their occupational
choices. Issues of mobility - exacerbated by the current monthly income nature of the welfare
indicator - will also require further understanding in this context. Policy implications would
seem to lie in the area of self-targeted labour programmes, or other safety nets, but it would be
foolhardy to go into greater detail before the profile of the group which seems to have fallen into
extreme poverty in 1996 is better understood.
Secondly, we have found that, even above the  15  percentile, where  urban Brazilians have
essentially 'stayed put', this was the result of some hard climbing along a slippery slope. They
had to gain an average of two extra years of schooling (which still leaves them undereducated for
the country's per capita income level), and substantially reduce fertility, in order to counteract
falling returns in both the formal labour market and in self-employment.
It may well be, as many now claim, that an investigation of non-monetary indicators - such as
access to services, or life-expectancy at birth - should lead us to consider the epithet of  'a  lost
decade'  as too harsh for the 1980s. Unfortunately, we find that if one is sufficiently narrow-
minded to consider only money-metric welfare, urban Brazil has in fact experienced two, rather
than one, lost decades.34
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Appendix 1:  Data and Methodology
Macroeconomic  Data.
All macroeconomic indicators reported in this paper are based on original data from the archives
of the Brazilian Statistical Institute (IBGE). GDP and GDP per capita figures reported in Section
I  come from the series shown below in Table Al.  This series was constructed from the current
GDP series (A), which was revised in 1995 and backdated to 1990; and from the old series (B),
from 1976 to its final year: 1995. The series reported below comprises the values of series A
from 1990 to 1996, and the values of series B scaled down by a factor of 0.977414 from 1976 to
1989. This factor is the simple average of the ratios A/B over the years from 1990 to 1995. The
series is expressed in 1996 Reais, using,  the IBGE GDP deflator.
Table Al:  Real GDP and GDP per capita, Brazil 1976-1996,  annual
(constant  1996 prices)
Year  GDP (reais)  Population (,OOOs)  GDP per capita (reais)
1976  434,059,220  107,452  4040
1977  455,477,123  110,117  4136
1978  478,113,823  112,849  4237
1979  510,432,394  115,649  4414
1980  562,395,141  118,563  4743
1981  538,474,976  121,213  4442
1982  542,971,306  123,885  4383
1983  527,054,370  126,573  4164
1984  555,515,747  129,273  4297
1985  599,129,793  131,978  4540
1986  644,002,821  134,653  4783
1987  666,708,887  137,268  4857
1988  666,304,312  139,819  4765
1989  687,391,828  142,307  4830
1990  651,627,236  144,091'  4522
1991  658,339,124  146,408  4497
1992  654,759,303  148,684  4404
1993  687,004,026  150,933  4552
1994  727,213,139  153,143  4749
1995  757,918,030  155,319  4880
1996  778,820,353  157,482  4945
The GDP per  capita growth rates plotted  in Figure  1 are derived from this  series. Annual
inflation and unemployment rates also come from the relevant IBGE series.36
The PNAD  data sets
All of the distributional analysis performed in this paper is based on four data sets (1976, 1981,
1985,  1996) of  Brazil's  National  Household  Survey  (Pesquisa Nacional  por  Amostra  de
Domicilios:  PNAD),  which is fielded annually by the IBGE. For the latter three years, the survey
is nationally and regionally representative, except for the rural areas of the North region (minus
the state of Tocantins) which are not surveyed. For 1976,  rural areas were surveyed neither in the
North nor in the Center-West regions. In this paper, we are concerned only with urban areas,
which are defined by state-level legislative decrees. The urban proportions of the population in
each year are given in Table 1. The PNAD sample sizes, as well as the proportion of missing
income values, are given below in Table A2:
Table A2: PNAD  Sample  Sizes and Missing  or Zero Income* Proportions
Year  Number of  Number of  Proportion of  Proportion of
households  Individuals  individuals with  individuals with
RFPC  missing  RFPC  = zero
1976  84660  385282  0.0052  0.0063
1981  110151  477607  0.0073  0.0141
1985  127128  520069  0.0073  0.0108
1996  91621  329434  0.0291  0.0313
Note: *: Income is Total Household Income per capita (RFPC).
Each PNAD questionnaire contains a range of questions pertaining both to the household and to
individuals within the household. Among the former, are questions about regional location,
demographic  composition, quality of the dwelling, ownership of durables, etc. The latter include
age, gender, race, educational attainment, labor force status, sector of occupation and incomes,
both in cash and kind, and from various sources. The main variables used in our analysis are the
those related to incomes, education, the demographic structure of the household and labor force
participation. Tables A6 - A9 summarize the main items in the questionnaire concerning these
variables, and the changes from 1976 to 1996.
Most importantly, the distributions analyzed in this paper (except where explicitly otherwise
indicated) have as welfare concept total household income per capita (regionally deflated). It is
constructed from summing all income sources for each individual within the household, and
across all such individuals, except for lodgers or resident domestic servants. The latter two
categories constitute separate households. Total  nominal  incomes  are  spatially deflated to
compensate for differences  in  average cost-of-living across  different  areas in  the  country,
according to the spatial price index given in Table A3 below:37
Table A3: A Brazilian Spatial Price Index (RM Sao Paulo = 1.0)
PNAD Region  Spatial Price Deflator
RM Fortaleza  1.014087
RM Recife  1.072469
RM Salvador  1.179934
Northeast (other urban areas)  1.032056
Northeast Rural  0.953879
RM Belo Horizonte  0.958839
RM Rio de Janeiro  1.002163
RM Sao Paulo  1.000000
Southeast (other urban areas)  0.904720
Southeast  Rural  0.889700
RM Porto Alegre  0.987001
RM Curitiba  0.987001
South (other urban areas)  0.904720
South Rural  0.889700
RM Belem  1.088830
North (other urban areas)  1.032056
RM Brasilia  1.037915
Center West (other urban areas)  0.968388
Note:  This regional price index is based on the  consumption pattems and implicit prices from the PPV  1996
survey, for the Northeast and Southeast regions, and extrapolated to the rest of country according to a procedure
specified in Ferreira et. al. (1999), where the exact derivation of the index is also discussed in detail.
We assume, largely due to the lack of earlier comparable regional price information, that the
structure of average regional cost-of-living described above remained constant over the period.
Temporal deflation was undertaken on the basis of the Brazilian consumer price indices IGP-DI
(for 1976), and INPC-R for the three subsequent years. For 1996, the INPC-R was upwardly
adjusted by 1.2199, so as to compensate for the actual price increases which took place in the
second half of June 1994, and which were not computed into July's index, since the latter was
already computed in terms of the URV. This  adjustment is becoming the standard deflation
procedure at IPEA when comparing incomes across June/July 1994. (See Macrometrica, 1994).
In order to center the indices on the first day of the month, which is the reference date for PNAD
incomes, the geometric average of the index for a month and for the preceding month was used
as that month's  deflator. Once again, this  is now best practice for price deflation in hyper-
inflationary periods. Once the deflators were constructed in this  way, the values to  convert
current incomes into 1996 Reais were as follows:
Table A4: Brazilian Temporal Price Deflators (Selected Years)
1976  1  4.115  1 1981  1  49.512  1 1985  1  2257.294  1  1996  1.000
A final possible adjustment to the PNAD data concerns deviations between survey-based welfare
indicators (such as mean household income per capita) and National Accounts-based prosperity
indicators (such as GDP per capita). The international norm is that household survey means are
lower than per capita GNP, both because the latter includes the value of public and publicly38
provided goods and services, which are generally not imputed into the survey indicators, and
because of possible under-reporting by respondents. Given that the levels of the two series are
not expected to match exactly, analysts are usually concerned by deviant trends, which may
indicate a problem with the survey instrument. On the other hand, it may plausibly be argued that
National Accounts data have errors of their own, and that many of the 'correction' procedures
applied to household data rely on reasonably strong assumptions, such as equiproportional  under-
reporting by source.
In deciding whether to adjust the PNAD data with reference to the Brazilian National Accounts
over this period, we examined the evolution of the ratios of GDP per capita to mean household
incomes from the PNAD (for the  entire country, and  without regional price  deflation, for
comparability).  As Table A5 below shows, these were remarkably stable. In particular, the ratios
for the starting and end points of the period covered, which are of particular importance for our
analysis, are almost identical. In this light, and since even the disparity with respect to 1981 and
1985 are reasonably small, we judged that the costs of making rough adjustments to the PNAD
household incomes on the basis of the National Accounts outweighed the benefits.
Table A5:  Ratios of GDP per capita to PNAD mean household incomes, 1976-1996
Year  GDP per capita (A)  Mean PNAD income  (A) / (B)
(B)
1976  336.6  190.2  1.770
1981  370.2  187.3  1.976
1985  378.3  188.6  2.005
1996  412.1  233.0  1.769
Tables A6 - A9 summarize the main items in the questionnaire concerning these variables, and
the changes from 1976 to 1996.39
Table  A6:  Comparing  Income  Variables  across  the  1976  and  1996  PNADs
1976  1996
Variable  Name  Question  Variable  Name  Question
V2308  Reodimaata  e.i.  o  Quanta  ganba  as  gunbava  meotalmenir  aa ocupu5o  V9532  Reud/Me.sal  nes.s  Qual  era  a  -ecdim-rto  mensal  que  gauhava  -ormalnente,
deelarada an  quaita  4  (ocupac9o/  peartssuo  que  -seree  em  setembro  de  1996,  nesse  traba1ho  (pr-inipal  - em  dinheira)?
a  -u-ru  durante  mais  tempo)?
V2358  Re.dimento-Variiv-l
V2359  Rendi..t.  TV9535  Rend/Mens-l  nense  Qurt  ens  o  enudimento  mensal  qu  ganhava  normalmente,
Prod/Mee-ada  em  setembro  de  1996,  nesse  trabalhb  (principal  am me.eadoesas
oa  valor  dos  produtos)?
V2362  Outra  Raida  -Outer  Ocupap9o  Tem  renda  habitual  alm  do delarada  no  quesito  8  -V23 12 ?  V9982  Rend/Mnnsal  no tea  Quai  era o rendimerl  a  manual  quo  ganhava  normalmeuse,
em  setembro  do  1996,  nes  tsabalha  ueuundario.(rm  dieheio)  7
V9985  Rend/Mental  no tea  Qual  era  o rediamntu  musesl  sle  gan-h-uanmrlmentu,
em  sesembro  de  1996,  ne-se  trabalho  seuundleio(  em  merecadarias
oa  valor  dos  prodntos)?
V1022  Reed  Mhs  9 Nouteas  Qual  .ean  rendimento  mental  qu-  gruhbva  norm.  lmente,
em  sesembro  de  1996,  not  ate  s teabalhos  quo  sisba na  stmana
do  22 a  28  de  setembro  do  1996.  (rm  di.ebine)?
V1025  Rend  MWs 9 Noutros  Qual  eea  o eradimouta  mossal  que  ganbava  nermalmerte,
em scttmbra  de  1996,  nos uutros  tbabalhts  qu-  tinho  or  semana
de  22 a  28  de setemb-o  de  1996,  (  -em  morcdorias  at  valor
dos p-edut-n)?
V2365  Ontra  Reada  - Apase.tudoiri/Penuo  Tem  ren.da  babit-a  a16m do de1rdaa  quetito  8  ,V2312  ?  V1252  Valor  I  Reod  apos Peru  Rec  Qual  -ra o  eredimento  mensal  qae  retebia  aarualmeetr
em  setembre  de  1996,  de  apusatladoria  dv instituto  de  previdn-eia
ot  do gaueno  federal  (em  dinheiro)?
V1255  V.I.,  I  Rend  Pent  Prev  Req  Qual  ra o  rendimeuto  measal  que  -e-cbia  n-rmalmeute
em  sosembee  d& 1996,  do peuslo  de  instituta  do  previdencia
on do goveno.  federal  (am diobeire)?
V 1258  Valar  I  Read  Outra  up6s Re  Qual  era o  rendimneto  mensal  que  recebias  ormalmunto
em setembro  do 1996,  de  oulva  tip.  de  apasontadania  (RS)7
V1261  Value  I  R-ctd  Outer  Pens  Re  Qual  -ra orndimunto  mental  que  -reebia  narmalmeete
em setembra  do  1996,  autro  tip.  de  presto  (RS)?
V2363  Otra  Reoda  - Alugadis  Tem  reeda  habital  a16m  da d-elurada  no quesite  8 -V2312  7  V  1267  Rend  Aleguel  Rev  Qual  era o  reudisuata  ma.  er.  - qe  eebia  neemalmaule
em untembeo d& 1996,  de  alug-el  (RS)?
V2364  Outer  Renda  - Doaq5o/Mesada  Tem  reuda  habitual  al1m  da  de"l-rada  so quesite  8 -V2312  ?  V1270  Rend  Don0c0  Rec  Na  Qual  er,o  reudimenta  masu  - q  ree-bia  nanmaImente
em  setmb-ro  de  1996,  de  doaa6o  -rurbida  do rIo  morador  (RS)7
V2366  Ostra  Reoda  - Outeas  Tem  r-uda  hobitual  al6m  da  deladno  qu-sia  8 -V23  12 ?  V1273  Rend  Ilras  Re-nbid  Qnal  ura  redimento  mens-I  que  -ecebia  normalmenle
em sntumbeo  de  1996,  deju.os  do cadesneta de  paupanqa  a
do ontrn  aplicaqOes,  divideudos  a o  e-o  runubimentos  (RS)?
V1264  Valou  I  Rend  Ab.na  Prom  Re  Q.al  era  a nendimenta  mensal  que  recebia  uurmatmunme
em  ueteubra  do 1996,  de  abano  de  peemauducia  (RS)?
V2956  R.mn..en..o  Tudna  Ocup.
Vn957  Remu.  re-gIo  Ourt.  Readl.
A  Som.  de.sas  dar.e  Igual  a  Sams  do tOdas  as  aurora
Fnte:  Constealda  Com base  -oa qsestion-Aias  a dicianarias  da  Pesquisa  Naciatal  por  Amestra  e Damijilies  (PNAD)  de  1976  e 1996.40
Table A7: Comparing Education Variables across the 1976 and 1996 PNADs
1976  1996
Variable  Name  Categones  Variable  Name  Categories
V2222  Sabe ler e escrever  -menos de 5 anos  V0601  sabe ler e escrever  0- parte ignorada
I -Sim  l-sim
2- Esqueceu  3-  nao
3- Nao sabe  9- ignorado
9- Sem declara,cao  -nao infomiado
V2223  Onde aprendeu a ler e escrever  -menos de 5 anos
I  -Escola regular
2- Outra forma
3- Nfo sabe ler e escrever
9- Sem declaracao
V2224  Frequenta  escola  - serie  - Nao aplicavel  V0602  Frequenta escola  ou creche  2- sim
0 -nao hi  serie  4- nao
I - l"serie  8- se v0601=1 ou 3 demais variaveis da par
2- 2  s&ie  9-ignorado
3- 30 serie  - nao informado
4- 4  serie  V0605  Qual a serie que trequenta  1- primeira
5- 50 srie  2- segunda
6- 60  serie  3- terceira
7- 70 serie  4- quarta
8- 8' serie  5- quinta




- nao  informado
V2225  Frequenta  escola  - grau  -Nao aplicavel  V0603  Qual o curso que frequenta  0-ignorado
0- nao ha s&ie  1-regular de 1° grau
1-  primeiro grau  2- regular de 20 grau
2- segundo grau  3- supletivo de 10 grau
3- medio prim. Ciclo  4- supletivo de 20 grau
4- rmedio  seg. ciclo  5- superior
5- superior  6- alfabetizagao  de adultos
6- alfabetiza,ao  de adultos  7- pre-escolar
7- admissao  8- pre-vestibular
8- supletivo  9- mestrado ou doutorado
9- Art.99 prim. Cielo  -nao informado
10 -Art99 seg. ciclo
I l-vestibular
99- sem declara,co




Table A7 (ctd): Comparing Education Variables across the 1976 and 1996 PNADS
V2226  Nao frequenta  escola - serie  - Nao aplicavel  V0606  Anteriorinente  frequentou  2-  sim 0 - nao ha  serie  escola  ou creche?  4-  nao I - I' serie  V067  Qual  tio o curso mais  elevado  que  0-  ignorado  ~  ~ 2-2  serie  frequentou  anteriormente?  1- elementar(primario) 3-  3' s6rie 
2- medio  primeiro  ciclo(ginasial) 4- 4'serie 
3- inmdio segundo  ciclo 5- 5' serie 
4- primeiro  grai 6- 6  s6rie 
5- segundo  grau 7- 7as6rie 
6- superior 8- 8'serie 
7- mestrado  ou doutorado 9 - sem declaragao 
8- alfabetizagao  de adultos V2227  Nao trequenta escola  - grau  - No  aplicavel 
9- pre-escolar 0- nao ha  serie 
-nao informado
1- primeiro  grau
2- segundo  grau
3- medio  prim. Ciclo
4- medio seg. ciclo
5- superior
9- sem declaragao
V060g  Este curso que trequentou  2- aim
anteriormente  era seriado  4- nao
9- ignorado
-n8o  informado
V0609  roi  aprovado  pclo menos  na  1-aim
primeira  s6rie deste  curso que  3- nao
frequentou  anteriormente  9-  ignorado
- nao informado
V0610  Qual  toi a srice que concluiu  I-primeira
com aprovagao  neste  curso  2-segunda







-n8o  in formada
V06 11  Concluiu  ese  curso que  I - aim
frequentou  anteriormente  3- nao
9-  ignorado
- nao informado
Fonte: Construida  com base no  questlonarios  e dicionarios  dia tesquisa  Nacional  por Amoatra  e Domicihos  (PNAD) de  IY76 e 1996:42
Table  A8:  Comparing  Labour  Market  variables  across  the  1976  and  1996  PNADs
1976 
1996
Variable  Name  Categories  Variable  Name  Categories
V2301  Qae  fez na semana?  -Menos de 10 anos  V9001  Trabalhou  de 22  a 2S/9/96?  0-Parte  Ignorada
0-Sem  ocupagao  I-Sim
I -Estava  trabalhando  3-Nao
2-  Tinha  trabalho  9-Ignorado
3-Procur.  Trabalho  Nao  informado




8-Vive  de renda
9-Doente/invalido












V2307  PosicAo na Ocupaeao  0-Sem declaraeao  V9008  Neste  trabalho  era?  I-Empregado permanente
I -Empregado  2-Empregado  permanente  agricultura
2-Conta-pr6pria  3-Empregado  permanente  outra atividade
3-Conta  Prop  NAo Est.  4-Empregado  tempor6rio
4-Parceiro  Emreg.  5-Conta-pr6pria  nos servipos  auxiliares
5-Parc.  Conta Prop.  6-Conta-pr6pria  na agricultura
6-Parc.  Empregador  7-Conta-pr6pria  em outra atividade
7-Membro  da Familia  8-Empregador nos servicos  auxiliares
9-Membro  de Inst  9-Empregador  na agricultura
I  o-Empregador  em outra atividade
I I-Trabalhador  nao remunerado
12-Outro  trabalhador  nao  remunerado
13-Trabalhador  na producao
88-Tem  ativ.agricola  e nao  inform.  Pos  ocup
99-Ignorado
Nao informado43
Table AS (ctd): Comparing Labour Market Variables across the 1976  and 1996 PNADS
























V2323  Meio p/consegairteabalho  S-Se-declarago  V9t IS  Provideneio  Tra  na SeS.  referacia?  I.Sim
I -AgZncia Publica  3-Nao
2-Agdncia Particalar  S-Sem resposta nos quesitos de proc. Trab
3-Dirmito Empreg.  9-Ignorado
4-Amigos/Parentes  Nao infarmado
5-Colegas Profiss
6 Anuncios  V91 16  Provideaciou  Trab. no mes rfernencia?  2-Sim
7-Recebeu proposta  4-Nao
8-Outra  9-4gnorado
9-Nada Fez  Nao informado
Fonte: Construida  com base nos qaestionarios  e dicionarios da Pcsquisa Nacional  por Amostra e Domicilios (PNAD) de  1976 e 1996.44
Table A9: Comparing  Some Demographic  Variables  across the 1976 and  1996 PNADs
1976  1996
Vanable  Name  Categones  Variable  Name  Categories
V1004  Sltuacao  1-Urbana  V4728  Situac3o  1-Urbana-area urbana








V210/  Condic3  no domicilio  I  -Chete de tamiiia  V0402  Condic3o na familia  l -Pessoa de reterencia
2-Conjuge  2-Conjuge
3-Filho (a) / enteado  3-Filho
4-Pais ou sogros  4-Outro parentc
5-Outros parentes  5-Agregado
6-Agregado  6-Pensionista
7-Pensionista / Hospede  7-Empregado domestico
8-Empregado domcstico  8-Parente do empregado domestico
9-Individual dom. col  nao informado
V0403  Numero da famiiia






V1402  ispecie  -Nao Aplicavel  V0201  Especie de domicilio  1-Particular Permanente
1-Particular  3-Particular Improvisado
2-Coletivo  5-Coletivo
3-Improvisado  Nao informado
V1012  fipo de area  i-Area metropolitana  V4727  tIpo de area  I-RegiAo metropolitana
2-Auto repreresentativa  2-Auto repreresentativa-nao  metropolitana
3-N3o auto representativa  3-Nao auto representativa
Fonte: Construida com base nos questionirios e dicionirios da Pesquisa Nacional por ATnostra  e Doomicilios  (PNAD) de  1976 c 1996.
Nota: A variavel Niuiero  da Familia (V0403) esta presente uo programa de 1996 e nao esta presente no prograuna de 1976, pois esta PNAD so esta disponivel a nivel de domicilio.45
Appendix 2: Table A2.1: Evolution of mean income and inequality:  a summary of the literature
Ano
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Household  In come per  capita
Bonelli & Sedlaceck
Gini Coefficient  0.561  0.550  0.542  0.549
Gini Coefficicnt (1)  0.583  0.588  0.584  0.589  0.592
Hoffman (2)
Mean (3)  4.7  4.8  4.6  4.7  3.8  4.0  4.5  5.6
Gini Coefficient  0.588  0.597  0.584  0.587  0.589  0.588  0.592  0.586
Theil-T  0.523  0.536  0.519  0.520  0.523  0.526  0.529  0.519
Ferreira e Litchfield
Mean (4)  143  126  125  150  213  166  166  196  164
Gini Coefficient  0.574  0.584  0.577  0.589  0.581  0.582  0.609  0.618  0.606
Theil - T  0.647  0.676  0.653  0.697  0.694  0.710  0.750  0.796  0.745
Total Individual  Income  (Active Pop.)
Bonelli & Sedlaceck (5)
Mean(6)  2241.8  2081.2  2264.0  2040.6  1835.6  2222.1  3112.8
Gini Coefficient  0.589  0.574  0.590  0.562  0.582  0.588  0.577
Hoffman (1) (7)
Mean (8)  340.2  331.2  297.5  293.6  335.7  426.1
Gini Coefficient (9)  0.585  0.572  0.591  0.587  0.599  0.589
Lauro Ramos (10)
Mean (11)  85.4  87.5  89.7  93.6  93.4  91.9  86.8  89.2  94.6
Gini Coefficient  0.564  0.543  0.531  0.530  0.514  0.520  0.534  0.536  0.545
Theil-L  0.556  0.511  0.488  0.486  0.457  0.465  0.496  0.498  0.521
Theil-T  0.709  0.607  0.571  0.560  0.513  0.527  0.565  0.558  0.584
Fontte:  Hoffman (89) - Pesquisa Nacional por Anostra de Domicilios  (PNAD) de 1979, 1981, 1982,  1983, 1994, 1985 e 1986,  Censo Demografico 1980  e Anuio  esatistico  1985  para os anos dc 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982  c 1983.
Bonelli & Sedlaceck (89)-  Pesquisa Nacional por Aniostra  de Domicilios (PNAD)  de 1976, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 e Censo Dernografico de 1980
Lauro Ramos (90)- Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra dc Domicilios (PNAD)  de 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 e 1985.
Ferreira e 1,itchfield  (96)  E Pesquisa Nacional poT  Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD) de  1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990.
Nota: (1) - Inclui as faTnilias  sem renda.
(2) - Para 1979: exclusive as popusla.6cs  das zonas rurais da regiao norte, Matogrosso, Matogrosso  do Sul e Goias e para 1981 a 1986: exclusive a populacao  da zona rural da regiao norte.
(3) - Valor real, en) salarios niinimos de agosto de 1980, deflacionado  pelo ICV-DIFESE.
(4) - US$ de 1990,
(5) - Exclusive pessoas sem rendimentos ou sem declara,ao de rendimentos. Somente PEA.
(7) - Somente PEA c/ rendimento  positivo
(6) - Deflator:IGP/IBGE.  Precos de Cz$ 1000 de scVt86;  exclusive 7ona rural da regiao norte (todos os anus), c zona rural de Matogrosso,  Matogrosso do Sul c C3oiis  (76 e 79).
(8) - Valores em 1000  cruzeiros  de setV84.  Deflatores: INPC.IBGE,  ate ago/85; ICVIDIEESE,  entre set/85-setV86.
(9) - Media ponderada dos valores minimo e maximo.
(10) - Universo: homens  entre 18 c 65 anios,  paxticipasido  da forca de trabalho, trabalbando  nmais  de 20 horas por semana e nmorando  em irca uTbanas;  ressda  total
(11) - Base: 1980=100.Appendix 3: The Estimation  of the Model: Regression Results
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Table A 3.1: Dependent variable: participation  of the household  head
Year
1976  1981  1985  1996
Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value
Occupied as employee versus unoccupied
Education  0,008  0,010  0,444  0,025  0,008  0,002  -0,004  0,008  0,598  0,001  0,008  0,881
Education2  0,002  0,001  0,000  0,003  0,001  0,000  0,003  0,000  0,000  0,002  0,000  0,000
Age  0,039  0,007  0,000  0,097  0,005  0,000  0,104  0,005  0,000  0,153  0,005  0,000
Age2  -0,001  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000
Gender  -1,833  0,040  0,000  -1,415  0,029  0,000  -1,291  0,027  0,000  40,922  0,025  0,000
Number ofmembers fromO to 14*  -0,001  0,009  0,905  0,024  0,007  0,001  0,029  0,008  0,000  40,015  0,010  0,124
Number ofrmembers  from 14 to 65*  40,052  0,011  0,000  40,050  0,009  0,000  40,049  0,009  0,000  -0,079  0,012  0,000
Number ofmembers older than 65*  0,076  0,049  0,121  0,000  0,041  0,991  0,001  0,040  0,982  0,006  0,045  0,892
Presence  ofother members  from 14  to 65 (dummy)  -0,008  0,139  0,953  0,659  0,106  0,000  0,922  0,103  0,000  0,494  0,106  0,000
Mean education*  -0,092  0,012  0,000  40,056  0,011  0,000  -0,083  0,010  0,000  0,009  0,011  0,410
Mean education2*  0,001  0,001  0,286  -0,001  0,001  0,316  -0,001  0,001  0,187  40,004  0,001  0,000
Mean age*  0,026  0,008  0,001  0,002  0,006  0,711  0,001  0,006  0,806  0,004  0,006  0,510
Mean age2*  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,014  0,000  0,000  0,003  0,000  0,000  0,014
Women proportion*  0,012  0,006  0,025  -0,010  0,004  0,018  0,003  0,004  0,508  0,000  0,004  0,940
Constant  2,465  0,167  0,000  0,403  0,107  0,000  0,518  0,103  0,000  -1,052  0,105  0,000
Occupied as self-employed versus unoccupied
Education  -0,063  0,011  0,000  -0,037  0,009  0,000  40,061  0,009  0,000  0,009  0,009  0,340
Education2  0,001  0,001  0,233  0,000  0,001  0,518  0,001  0,001  0,115  -0,002  0,001  0,000
Age  0,072  0,008  0,000  0,130  0,006  0,000  0,121  0,005  0,000  0,175  0,006  0,000
Age2  -0,001  0,000  0,000  40,002  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000  40,002  0,000  0,000
Gender  -1,719  0,047  0,000  -1,452  0,035  0,000  -1,412  0,032  0,000  -1,479  0,033  0,000
Number ofmembers firomOto 14*  0,030  0,010  0,002  0,075  0,008  0,000  0,096  0,008  0,000  0,055  0,011  0,000
Number ofmembers from 14to65*  40,055  0,012  0,000  40,049  0,010  0,000  -0,071  0,010  0,000  -0,090  0,013  0,000
Number of  members  older than 65*  0,036  0,056  0,522  0,067  0,046  0,145  -0,061  0,046  0,184  -0,081  0,051  0,113
Presenceofother membersfroml4to6S(dumny)  -0,015  0,159  0,925  0,689  0,124  0,000  0,909  0,118  0,000  0,469  0,126  0,000
Mean education*  -0,090  0,014  0,000  -0,036  0,013  0,004  -0,055  0,012  0,000  0,039  0,013  0,002
Mean education2*  0,003  0,001  0,004  0,000  0,001  0,674  0,000  0,001  0,638  -0,003  0,001  0,000
Mean age*  0,016  0,009  0,074  -0,016  0,007  0,020  -0,013  0,007  0,040  -0,002  0,007  0,740
Mean age2*  0,000  0,000  0,001  0,000  0,000  0,700  0,000  0,000  0,484  0,000  0,000  0,248
Womenproportion*  0,007  0,007  0,287  -0,002  0,005  0,670  0,002  0,005  0,660  40,014  0,004  0,001
Constant  0,646  0,188  0,001  -1,513  0,129  0,000  -1,152  0,121  0,000  -2,860  0,131  0,000
Source: Based on "Pesquisa  Nacional por Amnostra  de Domicilios" (PNAD)  ofthe  1976 and 1996.
Note: * excluding the head.48
Table A 3.2: Dependent variable: participation of other members
Year
1976  1981  1985  1996
Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value
Occupied as employee versus unoccupied
Education  0,207  0,006  0,000  0,122  0,006  0,000  0,117  0,006  0,000  0,073  0,006  0,000
Education2  -0,006  0,000  0,000  0,003  0,000  0,000  0,002  0,000  0,000  0,003  0,000  0,000
Age  0,333  0,004  0,000  0,314  0,003  0,000  0,315  0,003  0,000  0,303  0,003  0,000
Age2  -0,005  0,000  0,000  -0,005  0,000  0,000  -0,005  0,000  0,000  -0,004  0,000  0,000
Gender  -1,399  0,018  0,000  -1,143  0,015  0,000  -1,152  0,014  0,000  -0,860  0,017  0,000
Number of members  from 0 to 14*  -0,105  0,005  0,000  -0,091  0,004  0,000  -0,101  0,004  0,000  -0,123  0,006  0,000
Number of  members  from 14  to 65*  0,229  0,005  0,000  0,205  0,004  0,000  0,220  0,004  0,000  0,158  0,006  0,000
Numberofnmesnbers  olderthan 65*  0,195  0,021  0,000  0,090  0,018  0,000  0,119  0,018  0,000  -0,068  0,020  0,001
Presence  ofother members  from 14 to 65 (dummy)  -1,111  0,132  0,000  0,072  0,106  0,497  0,276  0,099  0,006  0,294  0,111  0,008
Mean education*  -0,313  0,007  0,000  -0,315  0,007  0,000  -0,328  0,006  0,000  -0,163  0,007  0,000
Mean education2*  0,006  0,000  0,000  0,005  0,000  0,000  0,006  0,000  0,000  -0,003  0,000  0,000
Mean age'  0,043  0,006  0,000  0,003  0,005  0,522  0,001  0,004  0,865  -0,011  0,005  0,029
Mean age2*  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,316  0,000  0,000  0,251  0,000  0,000  0,247
Womenproportion*  0,109  0,005  0,000  0,095  0,003  0,000  - 0,092  0,003  0,000  0,091  0,003  0,000
Self-employed  head  (dummy)  -0,584  0,020  0,000  -0,420  0,016  0,000  -0,351  0,015  0,000  -0,280  0,017  0,000
Labor  income of the head (if employee)  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000
Constant  -4,867  0,088  0,000  -5,055  0,070  0,000  -5,034  0,065  0,000  -5,191  0,073  0,000
Occupied as self-employed versus unoccupied
Education  0,196  0,013  0,000  0,052  0,010  0,000  0,010  0,009  0,267  0,085  0,011  0,000
Education2  -0,011  0,001  0,000  -0,002  0,001  0,001  0,001  0,001  0,136  -0,002  0,001  0,000
Age  0,369  0,007  0,000  0,356  0,005  0,000  0,362  0,004  0,000  0,347  0,005  0,000
Age2  -0,005  0,000  0,000  -0,004  0,000  0,000  -0,004  0,000  0,000  -0,004  0,000  0,000
Gender  -1,815  0,042  0,000  -1,428  0,030  0,000  -1,463  0,027  0,000  -1,343  0,030  0,000
NumberofmenmbersfromO  to 14*  -0,043  0,009  0,000  -0,010  0,007  0,151  0,002  0,007  0,785  -0,028  0,011  0,010
Number ofmembers from 14 to 65*  0,053  0,012  0,000  0,029  0,008  0,001  0,037  0,008  0,000  0,021  0,011  0,064
Number ofmembers older than 65*  0,224  0,039  0,000  0,025  0,031  0,422  0,083  0,028  0,003  -0,034  0,031  0,287
Presence  ofother members  from 14to65  (dummy)  0,199  0,230  0,387  0,943  0,165  0,000  0,769  0,150  0,000  0,898  0,173  0,000
Mean education  -0,262  0,017  0,000  -0,203  0,012  0,000  -0,215  0,011  0,000  -0,114  0,013  0,000
Mean education2*  0,008  0,001  0,000  0,004  0,001  0,000  0,005  0,001  0,000  0,001  0,001  0,312
Mean age*  0,007  0,011  0.522  -0,021  0,008  0,006  -0,010  0,007  0,144  -0,036  0,008  0,000
Mean age2*  0,000  0,000  0,484  0,000  0,000  0,046  0,000  0,000  0,926  0,000  0,000  0,000
Women proportion*  0,055  0,011  0,000  0,058  0,007  0,000  0,061  0,006  0,000  0,061  0,006  0,000
Self-employed  head (dummy)  0,187  0,036  0,000  0,141  0,026  0,000  0,160  0,023  0,000  0,512  0,026  0,000
Labor income  of the head (if  employee)  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0.000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000
Constant  -7,942  0,150  0,000  -7,682  0,113  0,000  -7,389  0,099  0,000  -7,905  0,120  0,000
Source:  Based on "Pcsquisa  Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios"  (PNAD)  ofthe 1976 and 1996.
Note: * excluding the head.49
Table A3.3: Dependent  variable:  Education*
Year
1976  1981  1985  1996
Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coethicent  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value
Intercept  -0,675  0,051  0,0001  3,392  0,031  0,0001  3,307  0,031  0,0001  3,239  0,037  0,0001
Age  0,310  0,003  0,0001  0,156  0,002  0,0001  0,185  0,002  0,0001  0,226  0,002  0,0001
Age 2  -0,004  0,000  0,0001  -0,002  0,000  0,0001  -0,003  0,000  0,0001  -0,003  0,000  0,0001
Gender  -0,115  0,024  0,0001  -0,110  0,014  0,0001  -0,043  0,014  0,0024  0,195  0,017  0,0001
North region  -0,826  0,070  0,0001  -0,732  0,040  0,0001  -0,679  0,036  0,0001  -1,092  0,038  0,0001
Northeast  region  -1,293  0,030  0,0001  -1,247  0,018  0,0001  -1,339  0,018  0,0001  -1,372  0,021  0,0001
West-center  region  -0,822  0,055  0,0001  -0,552  0,030  0,0001  -0,417  0,029  0,0001  -0,569  0,034  0,0001
South  region  0,061  0,033  0,0684  -0,107  0,021  0,0001  -0,166  0,021  0,0001  -0,152  0,025  0,0001
R2  0,119  0,085  0,099  0,115
Source:  Based on "Pesquisa  Nacional por Amostra  de DomiCilios"  (PNAD)  of  the 1976  and 1996.
Note: * People  older than 10 years
Table  A3.4: Dependent  variable:  Total members  of households  younger  than 14 years
Year
1976  1981  1985  1996
Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value
Intercept  0,231  0,061  0,000  0,659  0,043  0,000  0,832  0,037  0,000  1,580  0,033  0,000
Schooling  of the head  -0,085  0,005  0,000  -0,098  0,004  0,000  -0,086  0,003  0,000  -0,041  0,003  0,000
Schooling  of the head 2  0,001  0,000  0,000  0,003  0,O00  0,000  0,003  0,000  0,000  0,001  0,000  0,000
Age of the  head  0,106  0,003  0,000  0,079  0,002  0,000  0,065  0,002  0,000  0,009  0,001  0,000
Age of the  head 2  -0,001  0,000  0,000  -0,001  0,000  0,000  -0,001  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000
North  region  0,715  0,040  0,000  0,691  0,027  0,000  0,595  0,022  0,000  0,368  0,017  0,000
Northeast  region  0,501  0,017  0,000  0,483  0,012  0,000  0,392  0,011  0,000  0,230  0,010  0,000
West-centerTegion  0,374  0,032  0,000  0,308  0,020  0,000  0,232  0,017  0,000  0,047  0,015  0,002
South  region  0,064  0,019  0,001  0,015  0,014  0,270  -0,026  0,012  0,032  -0,004  0,011  0,677
R2  0,173  0,173  0,000  0,167
Source:  Based  on "Pesquisa  Nacional  por Anmslr de Dormicilios"  (PNAD)  of  the 1976 and 1996.50
Table  A3.5: Dependent  variable:  Total members  of households  with age between  14 to 65 years
Year
1976  1981  1985  1996
Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value
Intecept  -3,024  0,055  0,000  -2,854  0,041  0,000  -2,630  0,036  0,000  -1,958  0,037  0,000
Schooling  of the head  0,024  0,004  0,000  0,027  0,003  0,000  0,013  0,003  0,000  0,005  0,003  0,111
Schooling  of the  head 2  -0,003  0,000  0,000  -0,003  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000
Age ofthe head  0,258  0,002  0,000  0,247  0,002  0,000  0,236  0,002  0,000  0,205  0,001  0,000
Age of the head 2  -0,003  0,000  0,000  -0,003  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000
North  region  0,202  0,036  0,000  0,223  0,026  0,000  0,221  0,021  0,000  0,196  0,019  0,000
Northeastregion  0,032  0,015  0,041  0,094  0,012  0,000  0,127  0,011  0,000  0,117  0,011  0,000
West-center  region  0,091  0,028  0,001  0,083  0,019  0,000  0,107  0,016  0,000  0,033  0,017  0,051
Southregion  -0,027  0,017  0,109  -0,020  0,013  0,122  -0,059  0,012  0,000  -0,106  0,012  0,000
R2  0,185  0,199  0,000  0,217
Source:  Based on "Pesquisa  Nacional  por Anistra de Donicilios"  (PNAD)  of  the 1976 and 1996.
Table A3.6: Dependent  variable:  Total members  of households  older  than 65 years
Year
1976  1981  1985  1996
Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value  Coefficient  Standard  P-value
Intrcept  1,034  0,013  0,000  0,942  0,010  0,000  0,958  0,009  0,000  0,848  0,010  0,000
Schooling  ofthe head  0,006  0,001  0,000  0,005  0,001  0,000  0,004  0,001  0,000  0,005  0,001  0,000
Schooling  ofthehead2  0,000  0,000  0,001  0,000  0,000  0,001  0,000  0,000  0,335  0,000  0,000  0,033
Age of the  head  -0,060  0,001  0,000  -0,056  0,000  0,000  -0,057  0,000  0,000  -0,053  0,000  0,000
Age of the  head 2  0,001  0,000  0,000  0,001  0,000  0,000  0,001  0,000  0,000  0,001  0,000  0,000
North  region  0,010  0,009  0,263  0,003  0,006  0,597  0,003  0,005  0,554  0,002  0,005  0,776
Northeast  region  0,008  0,004  0,025  0,006  0,003  0,050  0,003  0,003  0,199  -0,002  0,003  0,513
West-center  region  -0,016  0,007  0,021  -0,006  0,004  0,190  -0,007  0,004  0,097  -0,014  0,005  0,003
South  region  -0,009  0,004  0,025  -0,003  0,003  0,362  -0,004  0,003  0,155  -0,004  0,003  0,245
R2  0,510  0,532  0,556  0,578
Source:  Based on 'Pesquisa  Nacional  por Amowsha  de Donidlios" (PNAD)  of the 1976 and 1996.51
Appendix 4: Figures52
Anos  Inflag5o  anual  Taxa de crescimento do PIB per capita
1976  0.415807391  0.075882257  41.58  7.59
1977  0.357078624  0.023947561  35.71  2.39
1978  0.382317228  0.024286355  38.23  2.43
1979  0.619987319  0.041748207  62.00  4.17
1980  0.795342571  0.074721737  79.53  7.47
1981  0.844575498  -0.063465143  84.46  -6.35
1982  0.855317408  -0.013398372  85.53  -1.34
1983  1.575321858  -0.049928718  157.53  -4.99
1984  1.744341494  0.031986942  174.43  3.20
1985  1.896145314  0.056405921  189.61  5.64
1986  0.571154652  0.053543234  57.12  5.35
1987  3.192561351  0.015535717  319.26  1.55
1988  7.027903132  -0.01884077  702.79  -1.88
1989  11.07192169  0.013611828  1107.19  1.36
1990  15.08922874  -0.063766297  1508.92  -6.38
1991  3.495892866  -0.00568845  349.59  -0.57
1992  8.99721581  -0.020662048  899.72  -2.07
1993  17.0639523  0.033612223  1706.40  3.36
1994  13.28010288  0.043252631  1328.01  4.33
1995  0.201152293  0.027621274  20.12  2.76
1996  0.094643222  0.013464913  9.46  1.3553
Figure la: Macroeconomic instability in Brazil: Inflation
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Source:  Fundacao Getulio Vargas (1999) and IBGE (1999).54
Figure  lb: Macroeconomic  instability in Brazil: Per capita GDP
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Figure 3: Truncated Pen Parades, 1976-1996
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Figure 11: Demographic Effects
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Figure 13: Shift in the Distribution of Education, 1976-1996
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Figure 15: A Complete Decomposition
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Figure 15a: A Complete Decomposition
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